Africa represents the fastest-growing market for military drones, with drone purchases quickly outpacing lawmaking. From Morocco’s imports of Turkish Bayraktar TB2s to Nigeria’s imports of Chinese-made Wing Loong IIs, African countries are acquiring drones faster than their governments can regulate them.
Unlike traditional arms deals, the transfer of armed drones, also known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), often comes with little to no oversight, conditions, or accountability. This often occurs because exporters are not signatories to agreements like the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).
Africa’s rapid acquisition of drones without any form of regulation, whether central or domestic, poses risk of violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by importers. This calls for stronger international regulation, oversight and end-use monitoring.
Photo Credit: Yulii Zozulia/ Ukrinform/Future Publishing. Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 is one of the most sought-after drones in Africa, with over 15 bilateral acquisition deals across the continent. Retrieved from Forbes.
End-Use Monitoring and Adherence to Arms Transfer Policies
The use of Turkish Bayraktar drones in Libya in 2020 showed the military value of drones and led to at least 15 bilateral drone acquisition deals across Africa. While Indigenous production (i.e. production that takes place on the African continent) now accounts for about 12% of the market, the vast majority of drones are imported from outside the continent.
It is the duty of both importers and exporters to ensure that this trade is done in a manner that complies with international humanitarian law. This can be achieved through the implementation of End- User Certificates (EUC) that regulate the terms of use, require possible inspections, and prohibit resale without consent from the exporters.
The US is known for its strict End User Agreements, as mandated by Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and has only recently started selling drones to Africa. As a result, many African countries have turned to China for cheaper drones and a “No questions asked” export policy. China, despite its international legal obligations, is known for its sale of drones without stringent rules. This means that for African countries purchasing drones from China, there is no end-user agreement. Turkey, another major drones exporter, imposes similarly minimal end-use requirements.
South Africa is the only African country with a body like the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), which considers the impact of exported weapons on human rights and requires an End User Certificate (EUC) before transfer. However, a 2024 Open Secrets reported that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have refused inspection from South Africa after receiving weapons. This exposes the fragility of compliance once ownership changes hands.
Across Africa, a unified regulation on drone transfers is nonexistent. Some countries in Africa demand permits and licenses. Others don’t require anything during transfers. Meanwhile, the pace of proliferation and acquisition surpasses legal regulations. In 2024 there were over 484 drone strikes in Africa. Mali recorded over 17 civilian deaths; reports on Burkina Faso show the death of over 100 civilians; and most recently, reports by BBC News show that a November drone strike in Sudan killed over 40 civilians attending a funeral. These killings of civilians continue to call for strict regulation of the use of drones.
Even States who have attempted to introduce regulation do so through negotiation via ad hoc or bilateral agreements, which usually have a weak binding effect.
Photo Credit: AFP. China’s Wing Loong II (WJ-2/WL-2), one of the most widely imported armed drones across Africa, pictured in flight. The model has become a preferred option for many African governments due to China’s low-cost exports and minimal end-use restrictions. Retrieved from South China Morning Post.
Legal Framework for the Sale or Transfer of Drones
Under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, an obligation is placed on states to “ensure respect” for the Conventions. This implies that States must refrain from exporting arms when they have reason to believe that the weapons will be used to violate IHL. Furthermore, Articles 16 and 41 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility prohibits States from knowingly aiding or assisting another in committing an internationally wrongful act. This principle extends to drone exports, as knowledge of IHL violations should serve as a deterrence to export.
1. The Arms Trade Treaty
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a global treaty that regulates the sale of conventional weapons. It ensure that weapons sold are not use to commit genocide, war crimes etc. it basically ensures that the is transparency and accountability in the sale of weapons across states. The Africa Union has affirmed its support for the ATT, and 25 African countries are State parties to the ATT while over 15 African countries are signatories but yet to ratify.
The scope of the weapons covered by the ATT are set out in Article 2 of the Treaty. The Treaty covers conventional weapons but does not explicitly mention drones. That said, it can be interpreted to cover drones because they fall under the category of “combat Aircraft.”
Article 6(3) of the treaty prohibits the transfer of weapons with knowledge that they would be used in the commission of atrocity crimes. This places a high evidentiary bar as the exporting State could claim plausible deniability.
Article 14 provides for the enforcement of the treaty in signatory states. However, it does this vaguely, without stating how to enforce the treaty in detail (e.g., sanctions, international enforcement mechanisms), leaving enforcement to state discretion.
2. Arms Embargoes
Arms embargoes are a form of sanction that restrict the sale of weapons. Often, sanctions are imposed to compel states to change their actions in the interest of international peace and security. However, its deterrent effect remains limited. Sanctioned states often find alternative routes such as illicit trafficking or smuggling. In other cases, third States openly violate arms embargoes. For example, Iran and the UAE have been accused of transferring weapons to Sudan while the country was under sanction.
3. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR specifically includes UAV capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of 300 km in Category 1 of its list of weapons. Its major aim as it concerns drones is to prevent proliferation of drones of mass destruction. So far, South Africa is the sole African signatory. This treaty is not binding on its members, and many key importing and producing countries are not signatories.
4. ECOWAS Convention on Small and Light Weapons (2006)
The ECOWAS Convention, which governs its 15 West African member states, also establishes mechanisms to control the transfer of small arms, but does not extend its scope to cover weapon systems such as drones.
Conclusion
The rapid sale and proliferation of drones continues to expose a legal gap in Africa. A regional framework is needed to ensure exporters impose strict end-use controls, while importers keep to their end of the bargain. Existing regimes like the ATT and MTCR remain too weak and vague to address the legal gap. South Africa’s regulatory body is a start for the continent, but it stands alone. The AU and ECOWAS must therefore work to expand their arms-control mandates to include drones. These regional bodies can develop drone use and transfer protocols that would harmonize licensing, mandate end use verification, and create a compliance body that manages acquisition and deployment.
Subsequent treaties should also be drafted with the evolution of technology in mind, to cover future weapons. Grounding such reforms in Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, would ensure reviews before acquisition. Only then can Africa prevent drones from becoming tools of unchecked warfare.
Itumo Goodness Sochima
Itumo Goodness Sochima is a law graduate from Ebonyi State University, Nigeria, and a researcher specializing in International Humanitarian Law (IHL). She currently serves as a Junior Research Fellow at the Lex Lata Centre for International Law and Comparative Constitutionalism and a Researcher at Global Rights Watch.
She has represented Nigeria internationally at the Brown Mosten Client Counseling Competition 2024, focusing on IHL-related issues. Itumo is passionate about using the law to protect civilians and strengthen global humanitarian norms.
When, after 18 months of siege, the RSF captured El Fasher, the atrocities only continued, with murder, rape and torture of civilians committed at a horrific scale. Yale researchers have revealed over 70 burial mounds in the land surrounding El Fasher. And while the RSF has now agreed to a humanitarian ceasefire, the SAF has refused to comply with the same if the RSF does not relinquish its hold on major cities. Many civilians have fled the city since the takeover, but over 100,000 people may still be trapped within its walls.
While civilians’ immediate humanitarian needs must be addressed, it bears considering the challenges to accountability looking forward.
Photo Credit: ReliefWeb. Crisis ‘far from over’ as malnutrition, thirst and disease continue to threaten vulnerable communities.Retrieved from ReliefWeb
The Legality of Siege and the Prohibition on Starvation
Siege starvation is not a novel concept in warfare. It means that a particular party to war encloses an area, reducing access to food, water, humanitarian aid, and medical supplies, thereby cutting off essential resources to the enclosed area. A siege can also manifest in destroying civilian structures that provide basic goods. The aim is to weaken the besieged party and pressure them to surrender. Siege starvation may also have other aims, such as to displace or kill a given population forcibly. When such tactics lead to mass hunger, one may label the situation ‘siege starvation.’
Under international law, one principle remains consistent: starvation must never be used as a weapon of war. This position of the law aims at preserving the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), including proportionality, distinction, and precautions in attack, as provided for under Additional Protocol I in Article 52(2), Article 51(5)(b), and Article 57, respectively.
Photo Caption: Anadolu Agency.UN official warns of ‘ugly’ humanitarian crisis in Sudan, as civilians face starvation. Retrieved from aa.com.tr
Legal Loopholes and Challenges to Accountability
1. The Challenge of Proving Intent
The law illustrates that starvation should not be weaponized against civilians. However, where this occurs, it must be proved that the warring party intended to target civilians. This is the Mens rea for war crimes as provided in Article 8 (2) (b) (xxv) of Elements of Crimes.
This position of the law creates a loophole for the RSF to claim that restrictions targeted enemy fighters, that infrastructure was a military objective, or that deprivation resulted from logistical collapse rather than deliberate policy.
2. Lack of Precedent
Even with the classification of starvation as a war crime in Non-International Armed Conflict, factors like lack of precedent still pose challenges as there has been no standalone trial for starvation as a war crime. The war crime of starvation has never been prosecuted in an international court on its own, only as part of around 20 other war crimes cases. In November, 2024 a warrant was issued for the arrest of Prime Minister Netanyahuand 3 others for war crimes in Palestine. However, this envisaged groundbreaking precedent was challenged by Israel’s lack of acceptance of ICC’s jurisdiction. This challenges the international community in terms of accountability, especially in cities like El Fasher, which is currently under siege.
3. Non-Ratification and Enforcement Gaps
The Rome Statute of the ICC is built in a way that the first signatories are not bound to further amendments, such as Article 8 of the Statute. The amendment of the Article is only applicable to the states that have ratified and accepted the amendments made.
Sudan has not ratified the Rome Statute, or its amendments. This poses no challenge for North Darfur. Because of the United Nations Security Council Referral in 2005 under Article 13 of the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Courthas jurisdiction over the situation in Darfur.
Another issue is the lack of enforcement bodies. For example, UNSC Resolution 2417 (2018) is a resolution that condemns starvation as a weapon of war. Although binding on member states, it lacks enforcement agencies, especially when it comes to non-state armed groups, in this case the RSF.
4. Challenge in Individual Responsibility
The Rome Statute concentrates on individual perpetrators of war crimes. It is difficult to identify the chain of command in a non-state armed group like RSF. Especially, because even though the leader is identifiable as Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, there is a lack of transparency in the actual chain of command on the battlefield, as the RSF is only loosely organized.
If this gap in accountability remains, cities like El Fasher and other warring parties will continue to face war crimes like siege starvation, as lack of redress or accountability encourages the contravention of these laws. Structuring the international community accountability framework to address this war crime, would not only serve justice to over 250,000 people who endured the unimaginable but would also prevent future derogation as well as reaffirm the world’s commitment to restoring humanity.
Itumo Goodness Sochima
Itumo Goodness Sochima is a law graduate from Ebonyi State University, Nigeria, and a researcher specializing in International Humanitarian Law (IHL). She currently serves as a Junior Research Fellow at the Lex Lata Centre for International Law and Comparative Constitutionalism and a Researcher at Global Rights Watch.
She has represented Nigeria internationally at the Brown Mosten Client Counseling Competition 2024, focusing on IHL-related issues. Itumo is passionate about using the law to protect civilians and strengthen global humanitarian norms.
The use of starvation as a method of warfare has wrought devastating consequences for civilians in African conflicts, and it only promises to get worse. In El Fasher, Sudan, siege-induced starvation has threatened the lives of about six thousand children. Looking to future African conflicts, import dependency, high rates of subsistence farming and challenges to humanitarian aid access make starvation a serious threat. And with climate change, the tactic of starvation in future conflicts will inflict even more tragic suffering.
I. Starvation under International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Starvation as a weapon is a broad concept that goes beyond causing suffering or death denying food. It also includes attacks on objects indispensable for survival, such as food, water and agricultural resources (Art. 54 of Additional Protocol I and Art. 14 of Additional Protocol II of the four Geneva Conventions). Under these provisions, parties to a conflict are prohibited from using starvation as a method to annihilate or weaken a civilian population. This prohibition is a rule of customary international law, binding in both international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.
II. Risk Multipliers: Import Dependency, Subsistence Farming and Challenges to Humanitarian Aid Access
Although Africa possesses 60% of the world’s arable land, it remains the most food-insecure continent, with a high level of food import dependency. Around 60% of Africans rely on subsistence farming. Though Africa holds untapped agricultural potential, paradoxically, it has been obliged to spend $ 60 billion annually on food importation. By 2030, it is estimated that 291 million people could be chronically undernourished in Africa.
Given the prevalence of subsistence agriculture, high reliance on food imports and food insecurity across the continent, humanitarian aid is often required to fill the gap. However, humanitarian aid does not satisfy the overwhelming food demand in Africa because of funding cuts, violence, corruption and supply chain failures. In Sudan, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated sharply with more than 30 million people (64 % of the population) affected. The USAID funding cuts have exacerbated the problem. Following the suspension of US foreign aid, about 80% of the 1,460 soup kitchens across Sudan were shut down despite the dire humanitarian situation in places like El Fasher, which have been targeted by siege.
Photo credit: Associated Press
In this fragile context, the deliberate use of civilian starvation as a weapon of war dramatically worsens existing hunger and malnutrition. It is just like pouring fuel on the fire; intensifying pre-existing food insecurity made worse by challenges to the humanitarian sector.
For instance, both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), have employed starvation as a weapon. In El Fasher, the RSF has sieged and blocked supply lines (for more than a year) where health facilities and mobile nutrition have been suspended. In this incident, about 6,000 children face “Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) and an exponentially high risk of death.” The international community has done little in practice to address the starvation crimes in Sudan. Moreover, there is still no precedent where perpetrators of starvation crime have been charged and prosecuted, despite the effort of the International Criminal Court issuing the first ever arrest warrant against the high military officials of Hamas and Israel.
By 2040, Africa is projected to exceed the 1.5°C warming threshold limit set by the Paris Agreement, a shift that is expected to exacerbate drought, disrupt agricultural systems and heighten the risk of widespread food insecurity and starvation throughout the continent. In particular, the Sahel region is highly prone to drought and subsequent decrease of agricultural production. Climate change triggered by an increase in greenhouse gasses would worsen the already existing food insecurity in the Sub-Saharan Region (see here also).
On top of that, climate change itself may trigger violence. By and large, communities experiencing climate-induced drought, erosion and reduced productivity may enter into a fierce competition to control resources, that could spiral into conflict. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reported that climate change has in part contributed to the Darfur conflict in Sudan. The Sahel is particularly vulnerable to climate-induced violent conflict.
IV. Future Risks and Starvation as an International Crime
Climate change and other factors heighten the potential impact of siege tactics, shortening the time between an attack on food and mass civilian death. A single attack on foodstuffs or blocking food convoys by the warriors produces acute food shortage and lethal civilian starvation far faster than in food-secure populations.
Starvation can serve as an instrument to commit international crimes like genocide and crime against humanity. Deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services, can constitute genocide (see article 6(c) here). Starvation can also entail a crime against humanity. And because international response is slow, parties to conflict may be more likely to use starvation as a tactic to target civilian populations.
This article affirms that starvation as a method of warfare will continue to threaten Africa. Strong accountability, climate resilient agriculture and humanitarian action are therefore essential to prevent future atrocities.
Berhanu Bayley Feleke
Berhanu Bayley Feleke is Assistant Lecturer of Law at Bahir Dar University, Intern at the Ethiopian Human rights Commission and Addis Ababa University IHL Clinic. He was also an Intern at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is LLB graduate from Bahir Dar University in July 2023.
Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (C) stands between Eritrean President Isayas Afewerki (L) and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (R) after signing peace agreements in Algiers December 12, 2000
1.The Ethio-Eritrean War – A brief background
The Ethio–Eritrean War (1998–2000) emerged from a longstanding border dispute that dramatically intensified following Eritrea’s declaration of independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The dispute over the Badme region, which had simmered for decades as a consequence of colonial and postcolonial contestations over borders, natural resources, and national identity, ultimately served as the ignition point for hostilities, exposing a profound legal quandary: What happens when a newly formed state has not yet acceded to central treaties of international humanitarian law? In particular, was Eritrea, an entity that did not formally ratify the Geneva Conventions until August 14, 2000, bound to safeguard Ethiopian prisoners of war under those same Conventions prior to accession?
After gaining independence in 1993, Eritrea and Ethiopia experienced escalating tensions over the disputed Badme region. These tensions culminated in armed clashes in May 1998, leading to a full-scale war that lasted until June 2000. The conflict resulted in extensive casualties, economic disruption, and severe humanitarian consequences for both nations. In an effort to resolve the dispute, both countries signed the Algiers Agreement in December 2000, establishing the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) to deliver a final and binding border delimitation. In April 2002, the EEBC awarded the disputed town of Badme to Eritrea. However, Ethiopia expressed deep dissatisfaction with this ruling and refused to implement the decision, maintaining control over Badme. This refusal led to a prolonged stalemate between the two nations.
2.The place of International Humanitarian Law
Ethiopia, having signed and ratified the Geneva Conventions by 1949 and 1969 respectively, was unambiguously bound by these multilateral treaties, which provide a comprehensive legal framework regulating the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of persons who are not, or are no longer, participating in hostilities. In contrast, when Eritrea declared its independence in 1993, it did not automatically inherit these treaty obligations from Ethiopia. International law recognizes that newly independent states customarily signal their intent to adopt pre‑existing treaty commitments through formal declarations or legislative enactments. While many successor states continue to honor international treaties, this is not automatic. In the case of Eritrea, there is a notable absence of clear legislative or formal declarations indicating that it intended to adopt the Geneva Conventions immediately upon independence. The Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission explicitly observed a “dearth of substantiating evidence” that Eritrea had undertaken the customary process necessary to inherit these obligations. As the Commission observed:
“However, the Commission has not been shown evidence that would permit it to find that such circumstances here, desirable though such succession would be as a general matter.”
In this context, “such circumstances” refer to the lack of unequivocal statements from Eritrean authorities and the absence of consistent state practice that would indicate a clear intention to be bound by the Geneva Conventions. This absence of demonstrable consent renders any presumption of automatic succession legally unsustainable.
To fully understand Eritrea’s obligations during the conflict period, it is essential to examine the broader principle of continuity in humanitarian obligations under international law, particularly in the context of state succession, where shifts in sovereignty or government structures raise complex questions about treaty obligations. According to this principle, certain international obligations, especially those related to fundamental human rights and humanitarian norms, persist despite changes in state sovereignty. This continuity ensures that newly independent or successor states remain accountable for essential commitments that uphold human dignity and the rule of law within the international community.
While the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties adopts a permissive approach under Article 16, often referred to as the “clean slate” doctrine, this framework is increasingly challenged when it comes to humanitarian obligations. The “clean slate” doctrine allows newly independent states to decide which treaties they will adopt, potentially enabling them to reject critical human rights obligations inherited from their predecessors. However, this permissive approach conflicts with the evolving understanding in international law that certain humanitarian obligations, particularly those embedded in customary international law, remain binding regardless of succession.
In his article, “The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under International Law”Matthew Craven argues that the continuity of obligations cannot be assessed solely through the lens of consent-based treaty succession. Instead, it must be viewed through the prism of an emerging constitutionalization of international law, where certain values—notably the prohibition of torture and genocide—function as normative anchors that transcend state will. Craven’s argument highlights that humanitarian norms are increasingly perceived as structural principles essential to the integrity of the international legal order, rather than optional commitments dependent on state consent.
“The principles underlying the prohibition of the use of force, the non-intervention principle, and the minimum standards of humanity form part of customary international law and constitute obligations erga omnes.”
The reference to “minimum standards of humanity” is particularly significant because it directly relates to the continuity of humanitarian obligations. These standards represent fundamental norms that persist irrespective of a state’s treaty commitments or changes in sovereignty. The erga omnes nature of such obligations means that they bind all states at all times, not because of treaty commitments, but because they are integral to the collective interests of the international community. Obligations erga omnes are distinct in that they protect global values, such as the prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment, which are considered essential for maintaining international order.
An Eritrean soldier at his post in Serha, Eritrea Photo Credit: Associated Press
In the context of state succession, this implies that successor states cannot evade responsibilities concerning core humanitarian principles by simply rejecting predecessor treaties. Instead, these obligations remain continuous and binding, regardless of political transformations. This continuity is grounded in the universal values that these humanitarian norms protect—values that safeguard the integrity of the international legal order and ensure that fundamental human rights are upheld even in the face of sovereign transitions.
From the moment of independence, Eritrean leadership made it clear through official pronouncements and consistent state behavior that it would not be bound by the Geneva Conventions until a later accession occurred. In particular, Eritrea’s persistent denial of unrestricted access to the International Committee of the Red for the purpose of visiting Ethiopian prisoners of war serves as a concrete manifestation of its non‑acceptance of the treaty regime. While the ICRC was allowed limited access—to a small group of civilian detainees according to stringent procedures—broader access for inspecting POWs was consistently obstructed. These obstructions reflect both a deliberate policy of noncompliance with the treaty’s procedural requirements and a rejection of the substantive humanitarian obligations that the treaty is designed to enforce.
In its Partial Award on Prisoners of War, the EECC concluded that Eritrea’s systematic refusal to grant ICRC access to POWs from May 1998 until August 2000 violated customary international humanitarian law (IHL), despite its non-accession to the Geneva Conventions at the time (para.62). The Commission’s findings, based on extensive fact-finding—including POW testimonies, Eritrean military directives, and diplomatic exchanges—revealed a deliberate and prolonged obstruction of humanitarian oversight (para. 55). Eritrea argued that the obligation to allow ICRC visits was a procedural rule tied solely to treaty law rather than a binding customary obligation (para. 56–58). However, the Commission firmly rejected this claim, affirming that external humanitarian access is an essential safeguard under customary international law and a fundamental protection against inhumane treatment (para. 59–61). It ruled that Eritrea violated its obligations under customary IHL from May 1998 to August 2000, as the denial of ICRC access deprived POWs of independent registration, monitoring, and relief (para. 62).
A central issue raised by these circumstances is whether, in the absence of formal accession, a state such as Eritrea may still be held accountable under customary international law. Customary IHL is a body of legal norms that derives its binding nature from consistent state practice accompanied by the recognition that such practices are obligatory (opinio juris). In the Ethio‑Eritrean conflict, even though Eritrea had not formally acceded to the Geneva Conventions, the core principles—such as the requirement to treat prisoners of war humanely—had already crystallized into customary international law.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia further substantiated the binding nature of POW protections in Prosecutor v. Tadić, where the Appeals Chamber held that “certain fundamental humanitarian obligations are to be observed by all parties to an armed conflict, regardless of whether they have ratified the conventions that contain them.” The ICTY’s ruling in Furundžija similarly affirmed that the prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment is a peremptory norm (jus cogens) from which no derogation is permitted, binding states irrespective of treaty obligations.
In Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights addressed the extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court held that the United Kingdom exercised authority and control over individuals in Basrah, Iraq, during security operations, thereby establishing a jurisdictional link under Article 1 of the Convention. Specifically, in paragraph 149, the Court stated:
“In these exceptional circumstances, the Court considers that the United Kingdom, through its soldiers engaged in security operations in Basrah during the period in question, exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.”
From this decision, it can be established that control over individuals, particularly in conflict situations, constitutes a sufficient basis for activating fundamental humanitarian obligations, as the exercise of such control creates a legal relationship that imposes responsibilities recognized under customary international humanitarian law. In the case of Eritrea, its authority over Ethiopian prisoners of war during hostilities necessarily triggered obligations not contingent upon formal treaty commitments, specifically the duty to ensure humane treatment and to facilitate humanitarian oversight, thereby guaranteeing that essential humanitarian standards are maintained through the very nature of jurisdictional control.
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) has ruled that incommunicado detention constitutes a severe human rights violation, facilitating further abuses such as torture and ill-treatment. In Communication No. 250/2002, the Commission stated that “the lack of external oversight in detention facilities constitutes an inherent violation of human dignity and is incompatible with international human rights and humanitarian standards.
Additionally, the ICRC’s Customary IHL Study, which codifies state practice, identifies Rule 124, stating that “the ICRC must be granted regular access to all persons deprived of their liberty in order to verify the conditions of their detention and to restore contacts between those persons and their families.” This obligation, the study finds, is “established as a rule of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”
Eritrea’s conduct during the war provides concrete evidence for this analysis. The repeated denial of full ICRC access to POWs is not merely a technical or administrative shortcoming; it signifies a broader repudiation of the international standards of humane treatment that the Geneva Conventions are designed to enforce. Such conduct, when viewed through the lens of customary IHL, clearly demonstrates that Eritrea’s actions violated universally binding humanitarian norms, even if formal treaty obligations were not in place at the time.
Permanent Court of Arbitration Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission – The Hague, Netherlands, 2000
A contentious yet crucial aspect of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission’s analysis is the role of military training in establishing state obligations under international humanitarian law. In paragraph 67 of the EECC’s Partial Award on Prisoners of War, the Commission noted that Eritrean troops and officers received “extensive instruction on both the fundamental requirements of the Geneva Conventions on the taking of POWs and on the policies and practices of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in its struggle against the previous Ethiopian government, the Derg.”
This acknowledgment raises an important question: can comprehensive military training in IHL indicate an implicit commitment to the humanitarian principles enshrined in the Geneva Conventions? On one hand, such training demonstrates Eritrea’s awareness of the conventions’ core principles, suggesting a de facto endorsement of international humanitarian norms. The investment in educating military personnel about these obligations could be interpreted as evidence of the state’s intention to adhere to those standards, even in the absence of formal accession.
However, while the extensive IHL training conducted by Eritrea certainly indicates an operational recognition of international norms, it falls short of constituting formal legal acceptance. Under international law, explicit consent is required for a state to be legally bound by treaty regimes. This consent typically manifests through legislative enactments, executive declarations, or formal treaty accession. Without such explicit actions, a state’s informal practice even those involving comprehensive training cannot substitute for formal acceptance. The EECC emphasized that despite Eritrea’s military training programs aligning with the Geneva Conventions, these efforts alone did not establish a legally binding obligation to comply with the conventions. Customary international law requires consistent state practice accompanied by opinio juris—the belief that such practice is legally required. In Eritrea’s case, while training demonstrated knowledge and operational alignment with humanitarian norms, it did not reflect the necessary belief or intent that these practices were legally binding obligations under international law.
Moreover, the distinction between operational practice and formal legal commitment is essential. Extensive IHL training can contribute to state practice, but without accompanying formal declarations, such practices remain aspirational rather than obligatory. This distinction underscores the principle that state conduct, no matter how aligned with international standards, must be accompanied by explicit consent mechanisms for treaty obligations to be legally enforceable. Consequently, Eritrea’s military training programs, although commendable in reflecting a certain humanitarian ethos, cannot by themselves transform informal practice into binding treaty obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
Eritrea’s subsequent accession on August 14, 2000, in conjunction with its extensive investment in IHL training, might indicate that its leadership tacitly endorsed humanitarian norms even during the conflict period. This is especially true in line with the description in paragraph 67 of the EECC Award and argues that such behavior reflects a de facto commitment that should mitigate the strict legal consequences of non‑accession. However, international law is clear that retrospective behavior, however positive, cannot be used to retroactively impose obligations for a period during which the state did not provide explicit consent. While Eritrea’s later actions may be interpreted as an attempt to align with international norms, they do not alter the legal reality of the conflict period.
2.1 The Binding Force of Customary International Humanitarian Law in State Succession
The broader implications of the Ethio‑Eritrean conflict for IHL are significant. This case exemplifies the dual system by which international law operates: formal treaty obligations among consenting states on one hand and universally binding customary norms on the other. Such a framework is essential in an era when not all states are willing or able to join multilateral treaties in full. The evolution of humanitarian norms from treaty provisions into customary law ensures that fundamental principles—such as the prohibition of inhumane treatment, the right of detainees to protection, and the oversight rights of humanitarian organizations—retain their binding force even in contexts where formal treaties are absent.
This case study also prompts to reevaluate the efficacy of international legal regimes in contemporary conflict scenarios. Non‑signatory states may attempt to evade the obligations of treaties by expressly rejecting formal accession, but the universal applicability of customary IHL provides a critical safety net. Even where political considerations lead a state to distance itself from formal treaty mechanisms, the underlying humanitarian imperatives remain enforceable through consistent state practice and the establishment of legal norms recognized by the international community. Consequently, the Ethio‑Eritrean War and the subsequent EECC decision underscore that the protection of human rights and human dignity in armed conflict cannot be nullified by a state’s non‑acceding status.
Moreover, these legal debates have significant policy implications. International bodies and NGOs have increasingly relied on the dual framework of treaty and customary law to hold states accountable for violations of humanitarian norms. In practice, the continued evolution of customary IHL is evident in the growing number of international tribunals and fact-finding missions that invoke these principles to secure redress for victims. As conflicts evolve and new actors—both state and non-state—emerge on the global stage, the interplay between formal treaty obligations and customary norms will continue to shape international responses to humanitarian crises.
2.2.Legal Consequences and Enforcement Mechanisms for Non-Compliance
From an enforcement standpoint, refusing to accede to key IHL treaties neither negates a state’s responsibility nor immunizes its officials from liability for grave breaches. Indeed, the ill-treatment of prisoners of war—recognized as a “grave breach” under the Geneva Conventions (e.g., Geneva Convention III, Arts. 129–130)—is subject to universal jurisdiction, obliging all states to prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators. Complementing these domestic efforts, the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Arts. 5, 8, and 12–13) empowers the Court to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, even absent direct state consent if the United Nations Security Council refers the situation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This mechanism was illustrated by Resolutions 827 (1993) and 955 (1994), establishing the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), respectively—both of which held perpetrators criminally liable for egregious IHL violations, irrespective of treaty status. Regionally, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, operating under the African Charter (Arts. 45–47), can open inquiries, adopt provisional measures, and coordinate with international mechanisms to address severe human rights abuses, thereby reinforcing that customary norms—particularly those reflecting jus cogens prohibitions like torture—must be observed by all states at all times.
What these complementary systems reveal is that the international legal order refuses to allow non-accession to function as a legal vacuum for atrocities. The duty to “respect and ensure respect” for IHL, enshrined in common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, imposes a collective obligation on all states to prevent and halt serious breaches. Thus, the rejection of formal treaty obligations offers no safe haven from IHL’s core prohibitions. In practice, however, these enforcement mechanisms neither operate in isolation nor function automatically. States exercising universal jurisdiction often face political or logistical hurdles in prosecuting foreign nationals for extraterritorial crimes, while the ICC relies on voluntary cooperation for arrests and surrenders.
Nonetheless, such barriers enhances the vital role of multilateral engagement and diplomatic pressure in promoting compliance. For instance, the African Commission’s investigative procedures—strengthened by non-governmental organizations and civil society—facilitate evidence gathering, foster dialogue on adherence, and channel critical information to international bodies. Over time, this interplay between domestic courts, regional institutions, and international tribunals dismantles the premise that non-accession to certain treaties can confer immunity. Instead, it highlights how robust legal frameworks enable the international community to impose meaningful consequences on states or individuals who commit grave breaches.
This article demonstrates that while explicit treaty commitments remain crucial for establishing detailed obligations among states, the fundamental humanitarian norms at the heart of International Humanitarian Law have attained a status that renders them binding on all nations—signatory or not.
Author – Wakjira Tesfaye Beriso
Wakjira Tesfaye Beriso is a former lecturer in law at the University of Gondar. He holds an LL.M. in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights from the Geneva Academy and an LL.M. in Human Rights Law from the University of Gondar. Wakjira has extensive experience in human rights law, humanitarian law, and international advocacy.
The Addis Ababa University International Humanitarian Law Clinic (AAU IHL Clinic) is excited to announce the launch of the Directory of African Human Rights and Humanitarian Professionals.
At the AAU IHL Clinic, one of our key goals is to serve as a hub for humanitarians, human rights personnel, and others working in or on conflict-affected settings in Africa. This initiative aims to compile a comprehensive database of dedicated individuals working in the fields of human rights, humanitarian assistance, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) across Africa.
Who Should Register?
We invite African academicians, human rights defenders, humanitarian workers, and other experts engaged in protecting civilians’ rights and promoting human rights, humanitarian law and peace in conflict-affected settings to join this directory. Whether you’re actively working on the ground, conducting research, teaching or advocating for policy changes, your expertise and experiences are invaluable.
Why Register?
Connect with Peers: Join a growing network of African professionals committed to the protection of civilians in conflict-affected settings.
Share Your Work: Showcase your contributions, projects, and achievements to a wider audience.
Collaborate and Grow: Discover opportunities for collaboration, networking, and professional growth.
How to Register:
To be included in the directory, please complete this registration form with your professional details. Your information will help build a comprehensive resource that supports knowledge-sharing and networking among professionals in the field.
We take privacy and confidentiality seriously. Please note that in the form, you can specify what information you wish to make public or keep confidential.
Thank You for Your Support!
We appreciate your participation in this important initiative and look forward to building a vibrant community of professionals working towards a continent safe for its people.
For inquiries, please contact us at ihlclinicaau@gmail.com.
Deadline For Submissions: Before or by 10th July 2024
From 2019 to 2023, Africa has continued to witness a significant rise in active armed conflicts and conflict events. This trend has been particularly pronounced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, and the Sahel region (especially Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali), leading to increased spillover effects and heightened humanitarian concerns.[1] Presently, Africa is grappling with an alarming surge in forced displacement, with an estimated 40.4 million individuals, as of June 30 2023, including internally displaced persons, refugees, and asylum seekers.[2] The majority of forcibly displaced individuals originate from countries grappling with conflict, with 14 out of the top 15 nations generating such displacement are facing ongoing conflict[3].
Forced displacement in Africa remains a pressing issue, with millions of individuals displaced from their homes due to armed conflicts across the continent. This complex phenomenon not only underscores the devastating consequences of armed conflict but also highlights the intricate interplay between forced displacement and the perpetuation of conflict dynamics. While armed conflict often serves as a primary catalyst for displacement, it is equally important to recognize displacement as a trigger that can exacerbate existing conflicts and contribute to the emergence of new ones.
The nexus of armed conflicts and forced displacement in Africa was further complicated by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has exacerbated factors that drive conflicts and instability. In addition, climate change, recognized as a ‘threat multiplier,’ intensifies competition over scarce resources, contributing to escalating or prolonging conflicts. High rates of youth unemployment are associated with a greater risk of political violence and may drive young people toward violent extremism, subsequently leading to or worsening armed conflicts. Addressing these interconnected challenges is crucial for devising effective strategies to address both forced displacement and armed conflict in Africa.
In connection with this, the Addis Ababa University International Humanitarian Law Clinic aims to understand the issue of forced displacement, and thereby inform policy decisions. Engaging with scholars from various disciplines, the clinic also aims to develop strategies to address challenges of forced displacement and armed conflicts in Africa, potentially creating a platform for collaborative efforts to address challenges faced by African nations in dealing with forced displacement in connection with armed conflicts.
In this vein, the Addis Ababa University International Humanitarian Law Clinic invites submissions for blogpost articles that study the multifaceted relationship between forced displacement and armed conflict in Africa. Authors are encouraged to explore various dimensions of this nexus, considering both the consequences of displacement resulting from armed conflict and the ways in which displacement can fuel or prolong conflicts. Potential areas for exploration include:
Overview of the relationship between armed conflict and forced displacement, highlighting the interconnectedness of these phenomena and their impact on individuals and communities.
Causes of Forced Displacement in Armed Conflict, including violence and insecurity, destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods, human rights violations, and ethnic and religious persecution.Impact of Forced Displacement on Individuals and Communities, examining psychological trauma, loss of social support networks, economic challenges, disruption of education and healthcare access, and the strain on resources of host communities.
Exploration of root causes of migration within conflict contexts, and strategies for addressing underlying drivers of displacement.
Legal frameworks and mobility amidst conflict situations, examining challenges and opportunities for displaced populations.
International Legal Framework for Protecting Displaced Persons in Armed Conflict, encompassing refugee law, international humanitarian law, responsibilities of states and international organizations, and challenges in implementation and enforcement.
Protection mechanisms for individuals fleeing conflict zones, and the efficacy of international legal frameworks in ensuring their rights and safety.
Humanitarian Response to Forced Displacement in Armed Conflict, focusing on the role of humanitarian organizations and agencies, provision of shelter, food, and medical assistance, and protection of vulnerable groups.
Long-Term Solutions to Address Armed Conflict and Forced Displacement, including conflict prevention and resolution strategies, peacebuilding efforts, and sustainable development initiatives in conflict-affected areas:
Strategies to combat irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and trafficking in human beings in conflict-affected regions.
The intersection of climate-induced displacement and armed conflict, and efforts towards climate adaptation and resilience among displaced communities.
Health challenges faced by migrants and refugees in conflict settings, and the need for targeted healthcare interventions.
Sustainable reintegration initiatives for returning migrants and refugees, and the role of readmission and reintegration in post-conflict reconstruction.
Protection of victims of trafficking amidst conflict dynamics, and strategies for preventing exploitation and abuse.
Promotion of free movement and mobility within Africa as a means of enhancing regional cooperation and stability, particularly in conflict-prone areas.
The gender dimension of forced displacement, such as increased risk of gender-based violence, loss of economic opportunities, and disruption of social support networks for women, challenges faced by displaced women including accessing healthcare, particularly reproductive health services and support for survivors of sexual violence.
Case Studies: Examining Specific Examples of Armed Conflict and Forced Displacement, providing in-depth analyses of particular conflicts and their impact on displacement dynamics in Africa.
Other Multidisciplinary topics such as climate change and youth engagement, especially in their relation to the dynamics of forced displacement and armed conflict in Africa.
We look forward to engaging with diverse perspectives and innovative insights on this critical issue facing Africa today.
Submitting Your Blogposts
We welcome original contributions from academics, students and practitioners from a variety of disciplines across Africa. Please submit your blogposts with the length of 1,500 to 2,000 words (except where agreed with the editors) to the following email: ihlclinicaau@gmail.com
During the selection process, priority will be given to innovative blogposts that demonstrate clear potential to contribute to and advance the legal and policy debates in the field of forced displacement and armed conflict in Africa.
Course Fee: Five thousand Ethiopian Birr (5,000ETB)
WHY TAKE THE COURSE?
Amidst the complex tapestry of armed conflicts in Africa, the need for skilled and compassionate individuals who can navigate the nuances of humanitarian action has never been greater.
This advanced certificate course by the Addis Ababa University International Humanitarian Law Clinic (AAU IHL Clinic) offers a unique opportunity for students to delve deep into the heart of humanitarian principles, equipping them with the knowledge and skills to become effective humanitarian agents of change in the face of adversity. By participating in this course, you’ll not only deepen your understanding of IHL but also develop the practical skills and knowledge necessary to contribute effectively to peace-building efforts and humanitarian responses in Africa.
Who Can Apply?
This advanced course on humanitarian action in Africa is tailored for practitioners and professionals with a deep commitment to making a difference in the humanitarian field. Specifically, it is ideal for:
Practitioners involved in humanitarian assistance and protection seeking to advance their knowledge in the area of humanitarian action
Human rights personnel dedicated to promoting and defending human rights in conflict-affected areas
Policy makers and decision makers shaping humanitarian policies and strategies
Individuals with a minimum of 5 years of working experience in the field of humanitarian action, bringing invaluable expertise and insights to the course.
If you are passionate about addressing the complex challenges of humanitarian crises in Africa and have a proven track record of engagement in humanitarian work, we invite you to apply and join us in advancing your knowledge and skills to better serve affected communities.
WHAT IS INCLUDED IN THE COURSE?
Delve into the multifaceted landscape and challenges for humanitarian action in Africa with expert guidance from Addis Ababa University International Humanitarian Law Clinic.
In this course, we will explore crucial and timely topics including:
Module 1: State of the Humanitarian Space in Africa
Understanding the evolving political, economic, and social landscape across Africa.
Analyzing current trends in humanitarian needs and responses, including access challenges and politicization of aid in Africa
Examining the role of local actors and the changing dynamics of humanitarian partnerships.
Module 2: Humanitarian Action in Armed Conflict
Exploring the legal framework governing humanitarian action in armed conflict situations in Africa
Navigating access challenges and negotiating with armed actors.
Applying protection principles and mitigating risks to humanitarian personnel and beneficiaries.
Module 3: Humanitarian Action in Disasters
Understanding different types of disasters and their specific humanitarian needs in Africa
Applying international disaster response law and principles in humanitarian response.
Coordinating with disaster relief stakeholders and managing early recovery processes.
Module 4: Humanitarian Principles and the Right to Humanitarian Assistance
Deepening understanding of the core humanitarian principles: Neutrality, Impartiality, Humanity, and Independence.
Discussing the legal basis and challenges of ensuring the right to humanitarian assistance.
Applying these principles in complex and challenging contexts in Africa
Module 5: Counter Terrorism Measures and Sanctions and Humanitarian Actio
Understanding the impact of Counter-Terrorism (CT) measures and sanctions on humanitarian operations in Africa
Analyzing legal frameworks and navigating compliance challenges in Africa
Developing strategies to mitigate risks and ensure principled humanitarian action.
Module 6: Protection of Civilians
Exploring frameworks and mechanisms for the protection of civilians in armed conflict and disasters.
Understanding the specific needs and vulnerabilities of different groups, including women, children, internally displaced persons, and persons with disabilities.
Advocating for and implementing protection strategies in humanitarian programs.
COURSE DESIGN?
The course is provided through immersive in-person workshops, where you’ll engage in dynamic discussions led by seasoned experts in the relevant fields.
You will also dive deep into real-world case studies, collaborating with fellow participants to craft innovative solutions to pressing humanitarian challenges. Receive personalized mentorship and feedback from experienced practitioners, guiding you every step of the way towards becoming a compassionate and effective agent of change in the field of humanitarian action.
Certification:
Participants who successfully complete the course will receive an Advanced Certificate in Humanitarian Action from Addis Ababa University School of Law.
Course Fee: Three thousand Five hundred Ethiopian Birr (3,500birr)
WHY TAKE THIS COURSE??
In today’s world, armed conflicts continue to pose significant challenges, particularly in Africa, demanding skilled individuals capable of navigating the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and other relevant international legal frameworks. Understanding the rules governing armed conflicts is not only crucial but also a moral imperative. This certification course provides a unique opportunity for individuals to deepen their comprehension of IHL principles, equipping them with the necessary knowledge and skills to navigate the complexities of armed conflicts. Whether you’re a legal professional, a humanitarian worker, a security personnel, or simply passionate about making a positive impact in conflict-affected regions, this course provides the essential foundation to become an effective agent of change in conflict affected regions of Africa.
By participating in this course, you will not only contribute to the protection of civilians but also learn to uphold international legal frameworks and ensure accountability for victims of armed conflicts – ultimately fostering peace and stability in the conflict-affected regions of Africa.
WHAT IS INCLUDED IN THE COURSE?
Embark on a transformative journey through our Course on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Africa, where you’ll gain a comprehensive understanding of key principles and practices essential for addressing the challenges of armed conflict on the continent.
In this course, we’ll explore the following modules:
Module 1: Foundations of International Humanitarian Law
Historical development and key principles of International Humanitarian Law(IHL)
Sources of IHL and their application to different types of armed conflict
Module 2: Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict
Relationship between IHL and human rights law
Specific human rights of civilians, combatants, and protected groups
Module 3: International Refugee Law and Displacement Law in Africa
Legal frameworks for the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
Principles of non-refoulement, asylum, and temporary protection
Module 4: Use of Force in Law Enforcement and Conduct of Hostilities
Legal framework governing the use of force in law enforcement and armed conflict
Principles of proportionality, distinction, and precaution
Module 5: International Criminal Law for War Crimes, Grave Breaches, and Violations of IHL
Categories of war crimes and mechanisms for accountability
Role of international courts in prosecuting violations of IHL
Module 6: Law of Neutrality and Humanitarian Intervention (Jus ad Bellum)
International Legal frameworks governing neutrality and humanitarian intervention
Role of international organizations in addressing armed conflict and protecting civilians
COURSE DELIVERY
Join us for in-person workshops led by experienced practitioners, where you’ll delve into real-world case studies and participate in lively discussions with fellow participants. You will Receive individualized feedback to deepen your understanding and application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) principles. Throughout the course, you’ll have access to comprehensive resources and assignments tailored to enhance your learning journey. Our approach ensures that your educational experience is not only enriching but also personalized to meet your unique learning needs.
CERTIFICATION
Participants who successfully complete the course will receive a Certificate in International Humanitarian Law from Addis Ababa University School of Law.
The Conflict in Northern Ethiopia that erupted on November 4, 2020, between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) followed rising political tensions between the two. Eight months into the war, the conflict spilled into the neighbouring Afar region when TPLF fighters mounted attacks into the region, and Afar forces as well as allied militias joined the fight. The two-year conflict which ended in November 2022 after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement (Cessation of Hostilities Agreement), has left a lasting mark on the communities it has impacted. Among the several challenges faced, the vulnerability of girls to child marriage stands out as one of the pressing concerns.
Child marriage is defined as any formal or informal union between a child under the age of 18 and an adult or another child. This practice violates fundamental rights enshrined in several human rights instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The FDRE constitution prohibits any harmful acts against children and women and requires marriage to be concluded based on the free and full consent of the future spouses. In addition, Ethiopia has criminalised child marriage under Article 648(a) of the 2005 FDRE Criminal Code.
The war in Northern Ethiopia has adversely affected the enjoyment of children’s rights, particularly their right to education, and protection from violence. The conflict has also led to the destruction of school infrastructure, which has resulted in an estimated 2.8 million children missing out on education in 2021.
While global trends indicate a decline in child marriage, Ethiopia is home to 15 million child brides. Recent research indicates that conflict and instability are significant catalyst of child marriage, with seven of the ten countries with the highest rates of female child marriage in 2017 are classified as fragile states. The top five countries being Niger (76%), the Central African Republic (68%), Chad (67%), Bangladesh (59%), Mali (52%), South Sudan (52%) and Mozambique (48%). Ethiopia has observed an increase in child marriage in areas hit by conflict and drought in 2022. According to estimates, for every year that the conflict lasted at its worst intensity, the rate of child marriage in Ethiopia may rise by 15%.
The prevalence in Ethiopia (40%) is slightly higher than the regional average for Eastern and Southern Africa (35%) and about twice the global average (21%). The prevalence of child marriage in Ethiopia has varied levels across regions. In Northern Ethiopia, particularly in the Afar region, child marriage emerges as a significant issue; with a staggering 67% prevalence among women aged 20-24 who were married before 18. Cultural norms, economic drivers, and displacement due to conflict intertwine, creating a complex web influencing attitudes toward the practice. The practice of child marriage has been deeply ingrained within cultural practices in the Afar region, with girls as young as 10 or 11 years old frequently being married off. Over two decades there had only been a 2 % decrease in the prevalence of child marriage in Afar region.
In the Afar region, attitudes toward child marriage are influenced by a combination of cultural norms, expectations, and perceptions surrounding marriage and girlhood. Cultural traditions prioritize early marriage and childbearing for girls, creating barriers to their education and personal development. Some individuals see early marriage as a method to ensure girls’ sexual purity and shield them from premarital sex.
The perceived impacts of child marriage vary, with responses emphasizing limited practical, economic, or social benefits and framing the practice as primarily rooted in cultural traditions. In interviews conducted with members of the Afar society for the research project titled “War and Child Marriage: The Vulnerability of Girls to Child Marriage Due to War in Northern Ethiopia,” by this author, some participants justify child marriage as a preventive measure against unwanted pregnancies or due to certain religious beliefs. For instance, according to an interviewed father, if a girl is not married by the time she starts menstruating he will be punished in the afterlife the longer he keeps her in his house unmarried (Nur, 2023, pp. 98–100).
While other participants in the study recognize negative consequences of child marriage, including physical and mental health issues, conflicts in marital relationships, and constraints on girls’ autonomy. Notably, fathers tend to emphasize advantages, while mothers and girls express concerns about the adverse consequences (Nur, 2023, p.97). Economic drivers of child marriage in Afar region are linked to poverty and economic hardship, as families may view it as a way to ease financial burdens and secure their daughters’ future.
The persistence of child marriage in the community is not solely a result of cultural norms but also attributed to a lack of knowledge and awareness of laws prohibiting it. In the absence of understanding legal protections, the practice endures through reliance on cultural and religious practices to determine when a girl is ready for marriage.
Humanitarian settings exacerbate these drivers as, during times of conflict and displacement, child marriage may be viewed as a strategy to protect daughters and ensure their survival in challenging circumstances. The research highlighted a concern on increased vulnerability of girls to child marriage since the conflict, driven by the desire to preserve bloodlines and ensure community continuity amid war-induced losses (Nur, 2023, p.122).
The impact of conflict, including displacement, social disruption, and economic hardship, has significantly increased the susceptibility of girls to child marriage. In addition, conflict induced displacement has dismantled the existing, albeit minimal protective systems, exposing girls to early marriage and various forms of exploitation (Nur, 2023, p.124). Families and communities, grappling with the consequences of conflict, tend to believe that early marriage provides protection to daughters, shielding them from harm, including rape and other safety issues.
Furthermore, there are other underlying factors that indirectly play significant role in exposing girls to the practice of child marriage, such as disruption of access to education, one of the protective factors defending girls against child marriage, and a lack of awareness and access to protective organizations contribute to this increase. Many girls face barriers such as financial constraints and challenges in resettlement, preventing them from returning back to school. Furthermore, cultural norms and priorities sometimes dictate that girls must prioritize marriage over education, with parents and spouses exerting influence over girls’ educational pursuits. The lack of quality education in conflict-affected regions, compounded by limited economic opportunities, further perpetuates the cycle of child marriage (Nur, 2023, pp.124-126).
In addition to the breakdown of education systems, many respondents are unaware of the services provided by organizations and institutions working to prevent child marriage and even those who are aware may face challenges in accessing them. This exacerbates the vulnerability of girls to child marriage in conflict-affected areas.
Ethiopia has introduced several policies and strategies to end child marriage with the collaboration of several international, regional, and local NGOs. One of the most recent programs is the ‘End Child Marriage’: A flagship program 2020-2025 which was sponsored by UNFPA-UNICEF in Ethiopia by targeting several woredas in Afar. Amhara and Tigray region. The situation of conflict and drought in Ethiopia poses risk to the program. (UNICEF, 2023, p.83.
The challenges for preventing and responding to child marriage in conflict settings are diverse and encompass several key dimensions. Firstly, limited access to conflict-affected areas poses a significant obstacle, impeding the reach of interventions and support services to those in need.
Secondly, the scarcity of local organizations and international entities on the ground further hampers the effective prevention and response to child marriage practices. Thirdly, the prioritization of immediate life-saving interventions in conflict settings may divert attention and resources from addressing the root causes of child marriage. Additionally, funding constraints, resulting from high numbers of internally displaced persons and the impact of conflict, may undermine initiatives aimed at combating child marriage.
The inter-mixing of displaced and local populations in conflict settings also contributes to the persistence of child marriage and complicates efforts to identify and reach those at risk. Moreover, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has intensified challenges in conflict settings, disrupting education, healthcare, and support services, thereby increasing the vulnerability of girls to child marriage.
Ending child marriage in conflict zones requires a multifaceted approach addressing cultural, economic, and social factors. Policies and interventions should prioritize child protection, address root causes like poverty and harmful traditions, and educate communities about the negative consequences. It is crucial to involve community and religious leaders in shifting attitudes and promoting alternative practices that prioritize girls’ well-being. Integrating women’s perspectives into cultural institutions is another way to ensure progress towards gender equality (Nur, 2023, pp. 131-135)
Additionally, further research is needed to identify policy gaps, understand the role of tradition gatekeepers, and measure the impact of child marriage to create effective interventions and support affected families and children.
Kulsma Nur
Kulsma Nur, a law graduate, is presently enrolled in the LL.M. Public International Law program at Addis Ababa University. With a professional background in journalism, research, and academia, her interests are in women’s rights issues, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and politics. As a CARD Werdwet Research Fellow, she completed the research “War and Child Marriage: The Vulnerability of Girls to Child Marriage Due to War in Northern Ethiopia” which focused on the nexus between war and child marriage in the conflict affected Afar region. Additionally, she is a 2023 Mandela Washington Fellow. Email: Kulsmanur12@gmail.com
