No Strings Attached: The Unregulated Sale of Drones Across Africa

Author: Itumo Goodness Sochima

Africa represents the fastest-growing market for military drones, with drone purchases quickly outpacing lawmaking. From Morocco’s imports of Turkish Bayraktar TB2s to Nigeria’s imports of Chinese-made Wing Loong IIs, African countries are acquiring drones faster than their governments can regulate them.

Unlike traditional arms deals, the transfer of armed drones, also known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), often comes with little to no oversight, conditions, or accountability. This often occurs because exporters are not signatories to agreements like the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). 

Africa’s rapid acquisition of drones without any form of regulation, whether central or domestic, poses risk of violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by importers. This calls for stronger international regulation, oversight and end-use monitoring.

End-Use Monitoring and Adherence to Arms Transfer Policies

The use of Turkish Bayraktar drones in Libya in 2020 showed the military value of drones and led to at least 15 bilateral drone acquisition deals across Africa. While Indigenous production (i.e. production that takes place on the African continent) now accounts for about 12% of the market, the vast majority of drones are imported from outside the continent.

It is the duty of both importers and exporters to ensure that this trade is done in a manner that complies with international humanitarian law. This can be achieved through the implementation of End- User Certificates (EUC) that regulate the terms of use, require possible inspections, and prohibit resale without consent from the exporters. 

The US is known for its strict End User Agreements, as mandated by Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and has only recently started selling drones to Africa. As a result, many African countries have turned to China for cheaper drones and a “No questions asked” export policy. China, despite its international legal obligations, is known for its sale of drones without stringent rules. This means that for African countries purchasing drones from China, there is no end-user agreement. Turkey, another major drones exporter, imposes similarly minimal end-use requirements.

South Africa is the only African country with a body like the  National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), which considers the impact of exported weapons on human rights and requires an End User Certificate (EUC) before transfer. However, a 2024 Open Secrets reported that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have refused inspection from South Africa after receiving weapons. This exposes the fragility of compliance once ownership changes hands. 

Across Africa, a unified regulation on drone transfers is nonexistent. Some countries in Africa demand permits and licenses. Others don’t require anything during transfers. Meanwhile, the pace of proliferation and acquisition surpasses legal regulations. In 2024 there were over 484 drone strikes in Africa. Mali recorded over 17 civilian deaths; reports on Burkina Faso show the death of over 100 civilians; and most recently, reports by BBC News show that a November drone strike in Sudan killed over 40 civilians attending a funeral. These killings of civilians continue to call for strict regulation of the use of drones. 

Even  States who have attempted to introduce regulation do so through negotiation via ad hoc or bilateral agreements, which usually have a weak binding effect. 

Legal Framework for the Sale or Transfer of Drones

Under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, an obligation is placed on states to “ensure respect” for the Conventions. This implies that States must refrain from exporting arms when they have reason to believe that the weapons will be used to violate IHL. Furthermore, Articles 16 and 41 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility prohibits States from knowingly aiding or assisting another in committing an internationally wrongful act. This principle extends to drone exports, as knowledge of IHL violations should serve as a deterrence to export. 

1. The Arms Trade Treaty

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a global treaty that regulates the sale of conventional weapons. It ensure that weapons sold are not use to commit genocide, war crimes etc. it basically ensures that the is transparency and accountability in the sale of weapons across states. The Africa Union has affirmed its support for the ATT, and 25 African countries are State parties to the ATT while over 15 African countries are signatories but yet to ratify. 

The scope of the weapons covered by the ATT are set out in Article 2 of the Treaty. The Treaty covers conventional weapons but does not explicitly mention drones. That said, it can be interpreted to cover drones because they fall under the category of “combat Aircraft.”

Article 6(3) of the treaty prohibits the transfer of weapons with knowledge that they would be used in the commission of atrocity crimes. This places a high evidentiary bar as the exporting State could claim plausible deniability. 

Article 14 provides for the enforcement of the treaty in signatory states. However, it does this vaguely, without stating how to enforce the treaty in detail (e.g., sanctions, international enforcement mechanisms),  leaving enforcement to state discretion.

2. Arms Embargoes

Arms embargoes are a form of sanction that restrict the sale of weapons. Often, sanctions are imposed to compel states to change their actions in the interest of international peace and security. However, its deterrent effect remains limited. Sanctioned states often find alternative routes such as illicit trafficking or smuggling. In other cases, third States openly violate arms embargoes. For example, Iran and the UAE have been accused of transferring weapons to Sudan while the country was under sanction. 

3. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

The MTCR specifically includes UAV capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of 300 km in Category 1 of its list of weapons. Its major aim as it concerns drones is to prevent proliferation of drones of mass destruction. So far, South Africa is the sole African signatory. This treaty is not binding on its members, and many key importing and producing countries are not signatories.

4. ECOWAS Convention on Small and Light Weapons (2006)

The ECOWAS Convention, which governs its 15 West African member states, also establishes mechanisms to control the transfer of small arms, but does not extend its scope to cover weapon systems such as drones.

Conclusion

The rapid sale and proliferation of drones continues to expose a legal gap in Africa. A regional framework is needed to ensure exporters impose strict end-use controls, while importers keep to their end of the bargain. Existing regimes like the ATT and MTCR remain too weak and vague to address the legal gap. South Africa’s regulatory body is a start for the continent, but it stands alone. The AU and ECOWAS must therefore work to expand their arms-control mandates to include drones. These regional bodies can develop drone use and transfer protocols that would harmonize licensing, mandate end use verification, and create a compliance body that manages acquisition and deployment.

Subsequent treaties should also be drafted with the evolution of technology in mind, to cover future weapons. Grounding such reforms in Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, would ensure reviews before acquisition. Only then can Africa prevent drones from becoming tools of unchecked warfare.