Author: Lea Mehari Redae with Contributions from Fekade A. Abebe

The epicenter of the current conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo lies in the Eastern provinces of the country, particularly in North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, and Tanganyika (highlighted in Red on the map above)

Background of the Conflict

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a country with one of the most complex and protracted conflicts in modern African history, spanning over two decades. The roots of the current crisis can be traced back to the early 1990s, a period marked by political instability and escalating ethnic tensions, and characterized by a web of armed groups, political instability, resource-driven disputes, and foreign interventions.

Compounding the problem is the DRC’s immense mineral wealth. The country is rich in resources such as coltan (used in electronic devices), gold, and diamonds. Rather than being a source of prosperity, however, these resources have become a curse. They have fueled competition and conflict among various factions, both domestic and foreign, who are eager to control these valuable assets.

The conflict in the DRC is a multifaceted problem with deep historical roots. It is a crisis that has been shaped by political instability, ethnic tensions, regional dynamics, and resource competition. Understanding the historical, geopolitical and economical contexts of the conflict in the DRC is crucial for developing effective policy recommendations and interventions to bring about the respect of International humanitarian law and protection of civilians in the country.

Historical Context

The roots of the current DRC's conflict can be traced back to the early 1990s when political instability and ethnic tensions laid the foundation for a protracted crisis. The 1994 Rwandan genocide triggered a massive influx of refugees and armed groups into the eastern DRC, creating a volatile environment. The DRC's immense mineral wealth, including coltan, gold, and diamonds, became a source of competition and conflict.   However, the causes of the conflict run much deeper, dating back to DRC’s colonial history. Understanding the historical context of the conflict in the DRC is essential for grasping the complexities and protracted nature of this crisis. Over the last two decades, the DRC has been plagued by political turmoil, ethnic tensions, stemming mainly from the legacy of colonialism, all of which have contributed to the ongoing conflict.
The roots of the DRC's contemporary conflict are deeply embedded in its colonial history, when it was known as the Belgian Congo. The Congo was first colonized and taken as the personal property of the Belgian King Leopold II from 1885 to 1908 and was named Congo Free State during the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-1885. During his rule, Congolese people were forced into labor, often on rubber plantations, and suffered abuse, torture, and murder. It is estimated that the death toll caused by colonization ranged from one to ten million.       From 1908 to 1960, after massive international pressure, the Congo Free State was sold to and colonized by the Belgian state as its second colonizer. The international pressure was due to the atrocities committed by the Congo Free State officials and international mercenaries against indigenous Congolese people, and a ruthless system of economic exploitation. This led to intense diplomatic pressure on Belgium to take official control of the country, which the Belgian Parliament did by creating the Belgian Congo in 1908. This second colony of the country exported copper, tropical wood, cotton, cocoa, and coffee to Europe. The DRC gained independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960 under the leadership of Patrice Lumumba, however, the effects of colonization continue to influence the socio-economic and political landscape of the DRC today.
From 1960-1966, Belgian Congo was known as Congo-Léopoldville (former name of Kinshasa – the capital city) distinguishing it the Republic of the Congo, which was known as Congo-Brazzaville.     Patrice Lumumba, a charismatic leader and a staunch advocate of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism, was the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Congo-Léopoldville, with his party - Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) - winning 41 of the 137 of Congo-Léopoldville’s parliament during the 22 May 1960 general elections. Compromising with Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of the Alliance des Ba-Kongo (also known as ABAKO), as neither had the majority vote, Lumumba became the Prime Minister with Kasavubu as President of country. However, political instability and external interference marred the early years of independence. The secession of Katanga, a mineral rich region in the south of the country, under Moise Tshombe in July 1960 and South Kasai – a region where diamond mines are located - under Albert Kalonji who proclaimed the establishment of the Autonomous State of South Kasai in August 1960, both supported by various foreign interests, became significant events that further destabilized the country. Lumumba was assassinated in 18 January 1961, a little after two months in office, further exacerbating the country’s instability. Early September 1961, President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba, later placing him under house arrest where Lumumba escaped. Thereafter, Lumumba was captured by the state authorities led by Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, sent to the State of Katanga, and executed by the separatist Katangan authorities. Joseph Mobutu, also known as Mobutu Sese Seko, was the Secretary of State for National Defense after the independence of Congo. He came to power in a coup against President Kasavubu in 1965, and ruled the country, for more than three decades. On October 1971 (until 1997), he changed the name of the country from the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa) to the Republic of Zaire.   Mobutu’s regime was marked by authoritarianism, corruption, and the pillaging of the DRC’s resources. Corruption was rampant during Mobutu’s reign. He amassed a large personal fortune through economic exploitation and corruption, leading some to call his rule the strongest example of "kleptocracy". It is estimated that he embezzled between US$4 billion and $15 billion during his rule. Despite the authoritarian nature of his regime, it was said that Mobutu managed to maintain a degree of stability in the country. However, this stability was , as ethnic tensions simmered beneath the surface. These tensions, along with the legacy of corruption and resource pillaging, laid the groundwork for future conflict.
The First Congo War, which took place from 1996 to 1997, marked a significant turning point in the history of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The war began as a rebellion against the regime of Joseph Mobutu, whose government ordered the expulsion of ethnic Tutsis (known as the Banyamulenge) from Zaire against the threat of penalty of death in 1996. Laurent-Désiré Kabila led the forces against Mobutu’s regime. Kabila’s group, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), was formed with the backing of neighboring countries, including Rwanda and Uganda as well as Burundi and Angola. The war commenced when the AFDL and Tutsi Militia engaged Zairean soldiers. By the end of the year, most border regions were captured. On May 16 1997, the AFDL captured Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire, ousting Mobutu. Kabila assumed power. Then renamed Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This war led to the death and displacement of around 200,000 and 250,000 people respectively. This conflict set the stage for future violence and foreign involvement in the DRC. Kabila’s unstable government subsequently came into conflict with his allies, setting the stage for the Second Congo War. The Second Congo War, also known as ‘Africa’s World War’ or Africa’s Great War, considering the number of African countries involved began in the DRC in August 1998, little more than a year after the First Congo War. The war started when Rwanda invaded the DRC in response to Laurent-Désiré Kabila, by then president of the DRC, severing ties with Rwanda and Uganda, as well as allowing the Hutu Militia to reform in DRC. This war involved Eight African countries and around twenty-five armed groups, and was named as the deadliest conflict worldwide since World War II. The DRC was supported by Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, fighting against Rwanda supported by Uganda and Burundi as well as armed groups supported by them. The UN was also involved through the United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The casualties of this war are estimated any where between 1 and 5 million people, with millions more displaced. On January 16, 2001 Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated by his body guard, and was succeeded by his son Major General Joseph Kabila sworn in on January 24, 2001. The war officially ended in July 2003 when the Transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo took power. Although a peace agreement was signed in 2002 between the DRC government, and the various non-state armed groups, violence has continued in many regions of the country, especially in the east. The First and Second Congo Wars laid the groundwork for the complex web of conflicts that would continue to plague the DRC. Since the official end of the Second Congo War in 2003, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has continued to experience a series of armed conflicts. These conflicts have involved various militant groups fighting over territory and natural resources. The violence has resulted in high rates of civilian casualties and displacement. Particularly since 2020, the DRC experienced a spike in violence, with clashes involving militant groups, extrajudicial killings by security forces, political violence, and rising tensions with neighboring countries. The conflict dynamics in the DRC are complex and rapidly changing, and the humanitarian crises dire.

Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

For any armed conflict, distinguishing between international armed conflicts (IAC) and non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) is of paramount importance. It determines the applicability of the different legal regimes, particularly under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and relevant safeguards, ensuring that combatants/fighters and civilians receive appropriate protection and treatment in times of war. An accurate classification is fundamental to upholding the principles of IHL and mitigating the human suffering caused by armed conflicts. 

Armed conflicts usually fought between states – where at the very least, persons that are attributable to one state commit an act of violence, approved by the highest authorities of the state, against another state, or where there is a declaration of war would amount to an international armed conflict (IAC).[1] These types of armed conflicts are mainly governed by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1997, although other laws also apply. Armed conflicts that are not of an international character, as per Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, that fulfil the cumulative requirements of intensity and a certain level of organization of the parties to the conflict are referred to as non-international armed conflicts.[2]

The following section will analyze the intensity of violence and organization of the parties to the conflict in DRC based on the non-exhaustive indicative factors provided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)[3] to determine whether they qualify as NIACs.

[1] Marco Sassoli, International Humanitarian Law Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019, p. 169

[2] Ibid, p. 180&181

[3] International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj (Haradinaj et al.), Trial Chamber Judgement, 3 April 2008, Case No. IT-04-84-T para. 49 “Trial Chambers have relied on indicative factors relevant for assessing the “intensity” criterion, none of which are, in themselves, essential to establish that the criterion is satisfied. These indicative factors include the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of weapons and other military equipment used; the number and calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing combat zones. The involvement of the UN Security Council may also be a reflection of the intensity of a conflict.” and para 60 “Trial Chambers have relied on several indicative factors, none of which are, in themselves, essential to establish whether the “organization” criterion is fulfilled. Such indicative factors include the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group; the existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the ability of the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace accords.” 

Intensity of Violence

Multiple armed conflicts are ongoing in the DRC, including conflicts involving the Congolese armed forces [in French: Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo] (FARDC) against various non-state armed groups and, numerous non-state armed groups amongst each other, foreign interventions, and peacekeeping efforts. The provinces most affected by these conflicts include North and South Kivu, Kasai, and Ituri, although violence is widespread across the entire country.

The intensity of violence in the DRC has reached a significant level. Some of the contributing Factors for the intensity include the number and duration of individual confrontations, the types of weapons and military equipment used, the number of combatants involved, the number of casualties, material destruction, and civilian displacement, as outlined by the ICTY. The involvement of the United Nations Security Council further attests to the level of intensity of violence in the country.

The DRC has experienced prolonged and intense violence in the numerous conflicts taking place in the country. The intensity of this violence can be better understood by examining various factors contributing to the severity of the situation.

Intensity of violence

The DRC has had a series of conflicts that involve a multitude of non-state armed groups. These groups engage in frequent confrontations with the Congolese armed forces (FARDC), and the non-state armed groups amongst themselves. In 2022 alone, there have been over 1,300 individual confrontations in Eastern DRC and the Mai-Ndombe province. Clashes are often protracted, with recurring skirmishes and battles lasting for extended periods. This continuous cycle of violence has prevented any significant respite for the affected regions and their populations.
The conflicts in the DRC are characterized by the use of a wide array of weapons and military equipment, including but not limited to, assault rifles, heavy machine guns, anti-tank Guns and anti-aircraft missile systems. Non-state armed groups often employ various small arms, light weapons, and even heavy artillery. Additionally, the proliferation of arms and ammunition in the region has exacerbated the intensity of the violence, enabling these groups to carry out sustained military operations.
The number of combatants involved in the conflicts in the DRC is substantial. The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) are at the forefront of the armed conflict, fighting against the over 120 armed groups and militia which consist of numerous fighters, many of whom have varying degrees of military training and experience. This results in significant engagements with sizable forces on both sides, leading to protracted and intense clashes.
The conflicts in the DRC have resulted in a high number of casualties, including combatants, fighters, and civilians. The toll on human lives has been devastating, with fatalities and injuries occurring on a significant scale. Based on information from ACLED, in the past year alone (from 1 December 2022 to 1 December 2023) there have been 4,215 reported fatalities directly as a result various violent conflicts in the country. The number of casualties underscores the gravity of the situation and the brutal nature of the fighting.
The armed conflicts have taken a heavy toll on infrastructure, including homes, schools, healthcare facilities, and critical infrastructure. Extensive material destruction has disrupted the lives of countless people and hindered humanitarian relief efforts. This destruction adds to the intensity of the violence by exacerbating the suffering of the civilian population. In the first month of 2023 alone the UNHCR has reported that, in Ituri due to a series of attacks by non-state armed groups, 2,000 houses were destroyed and 80 schools were either closed or demolished.
The violence in the DRC has led to large-scale displacement of civilians. People flee their homes to escape the conflict, and the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees is substantial. Currently, there are over 6.3million IDPs in DRC, with the North Kivu province hosting over 2.3million IDPs. There are also over a million refugees and asylum seekers from DRC. The sheer scale of population displacement is an indicator of the severe security conditions in the affected areas.
The fact that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been engaged in addressing the situation in the DRC underscores the severity of the conflicts. The UNSC has authorized various missions namely the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by its Resolution 1279 of 30 November 1999 and Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May 2010, which renamed the MONUC (as of 1 July) as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), to stabilize the country and protect civilians. The presence of a UN peacekeeping mission reflects the international community's recognition of the gravity of the situation.   Since 1995, the UNSC has passed over 70 Resolutions on DRC.

Organization of Armed Groups

The DRC’s internal dynamics have been characterized by the emergence of numerous armed groups, each with its own agenda. More than 120 armed groups operate in the DRC. Since the 1990s, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and the National Liberation Forces (FNL) were the most notable armed groups. More recent parties to the armed conflict in the DRC include the M23, and the Cooperative for Development of the Congo’s (Coopérative de développement économique du Congo, CODECO). In addition, Mai-Mai militias – small scale community-based militia groups that are formed to defend local communities and territory against other armed groups have also been active in the conflicts in DRC since the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Mai-Mai Yakutumba is an example of a recent Mai-Mai militia involved in intense confrontations with the FARDC. These groups are often led by warlords, traditional tribal elders, village heads and politically motivated resistance fighters. 

The various armed groups have often operated in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, exploiting local grievances and resources to sustain their activities. Several armed groups are involved in these conflicts, each with its own structure and objectives. Major non-state armed groups currently active in DRC include:

  1. Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23): Composed of Tutsi ethnic group members, the M23 has close ties with Tutsi communities in Rwanda. It emerged in Kivu in 2012 following a mutiny by former members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). Its organizational structure and military capacity meet the criteria for a non-state armed group.
  2. National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) [in French: Congrès national pour la défense du people]:  Founded in 2006, this group aimed to defend Congolese Tutsi living in the eastern Congo as well as the Congolese Tutsi refugee communities living in Rwanda. In 2009, CNDP signed a peace agreement with the government, ending the armed conflict, However, former members of CNDP formed the M23.
  3. Mai-Mai Yakutumba: Founded in 2007 by “General” William Yakutumba – a self-proclaimed general, the group’s primary goal is to protect the Bembe community in South Kivu. While its hierarchical structure is not entirely clear, its military capabilities and the ability to procure and distribute arms suggest a certain level of organization. Yakutumba also serves as the Secretary-General and Commander of the Coalition Nationale du Peuple pour la Souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC), a coalition comprising the Mai-Mai militias in the South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
  4. Coopérative de développement économique du Congo (CODECO) – This group as formed in the 1970s as an agricultural cooperative with roots in the agriculturist Lendu communities of the Ituri Province. It participated in the Ituri War from 1999-2003 joining the Patriotic Resistance Front of Ituri (FRPI) and after the cessation of hostilities the group was not dissolved and kept the weapons used during the conflict. Despite a period of inactivity, it re-engaged in armed conflicts in 2018 with clashes with FARDC persisted in 2021, resulting in casualties on both sides. Hostilities with FARDC have continued into 2023.
  5.  The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is a Christian extremist organization which operates in northern Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the DRC. The LRA has been waging a guerrilla campaign in Central Africa since 1987, and has been committing massacres, sexual-based violence, mutilations, pillage, and abductions against the local communities as well as attacks against elephants in Garamba National Park in Eastern DRC to pillage and trade ivory. The LRA’s activities in the DRC are a part of the larger armed conflict in the country since the 1990s. The rebel group conducted some of the biggest massacres, (e.g. the Christmas Massacres) in its history in the country and continues to be active there. The account of various actors within the DRC (as per interviews with civilians, and local authorities conducted by Kristof Titeca in the working paper titled ‘The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the Democratic Republic of Congo: (Un)Invited guests?’) is that the  the LRA was invited and supported by the Congolese authorities however such claims have not been properly corroborated.
  6. Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) – (in French: Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda) – founded in 2000, it is one of the most active armed groups operating primarily in Eastern DRC. FDLR is comprised predominantly of ethnic Hutus and members with historical ties to the Rwandan government and army ousted in 1994, as well as Rwandan refugees from the 1994 Genocide. The FDLR has left a devastating impact on the region, such as targeting women and children, sexual violence, killing, maiming and forced displacements among many other violation of IHL.  

To provide an in-depth understanding of the internal dynamics, the AAU IHL Clinic will profile one of the notable non-state armed groups active in DRC in 2023, the M23, as an illustrative case.

Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23)

The Movement of March 23 (M23), [in French: Mouvement du 23 Mars also known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army (Armée révolutionnaire du Congo/ARC) however, for the purposes of the AAU IHL Clinic Conflict Monitoring System, only the reference M23 will be used], is an armed group that primarily operates in the North Kivu province of the DRC. The M23 has alleged backing from the Rwandan government, which further complicates the regional dynamics.

The origins of the M23 can be traced back to the disrupted integration process of Rwandophone militants following the Congo Wars. This process led to a split among militants, with some wishing to return to Rwanda and others desiring to stay in the DRC. Those who remained in the DRC formed the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) under the leadership of Laurent Nkunda, a former militant of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – a former Rwandan rebel group and, following the genocide in 1994, the ruling political party. The CNDP aimed to protect Congolese Tutsi and received support from Rwanda.

The M23 name stems from the failed negotiation process between the CNDP and the DRC government on March 23, 2009. The breakdown of the integration process between the FARDC and former CNDP militants in 2012 led to the establishment and activation of the M23. The M23 quickly gained control over territory in Nord Kivu, including the provincial capital city of Goma, which borders Rwanda. They briefly captured Goma in late 2012, with political violence escalating in November before the M23 withdrew in December, following agreements between the DRC government and the M23 brokered by international mediators.

The M23’s violence continued around Goma in the following months, especially in Rutshuru and Nyiragongo territories. Between 2012 and 2013, the M23 engaged in over 20% of all political violence events in the DRC, making it the most active non-state armed group in the country during that period. A significant offensive by the FARDC and United Nations peacekeepers in November 2013 inflicted heavy losses among the M23 ranks and led to a reduction in Rwandan military support. M23 militants were pushed into Uganda, where M23 leader Sultani Makenga and hundreds of fighters surrendered.

However, the M23 re-emerged in late 2021 as the most active non-state armed group in Nord Kivu and as per ACLED’s report, this led to a nearly thirty-fold increase in activity in 2022 compared to the previous year.

Does the M23 qualify as an organized armed group? 

© africanews Moses Sawasawa/Copyright 2022 M23 rebels prepare to leave from their positions Kibumba, Eastern DRC, Dec. 2022

In the following section, drawing upon the indicative factors under the Tadić case, the AAU IHL Clinic will briefly assess the M23’s status in IHL:

Organization of the M23

The M23 exhibits a well-defined command structure led by its political head, President Bertrand Bisimwa, and long-time military chief General Sultani Makenga. General Makenga's longstanding leadership role and military expertise emphasize the group's hierarchy. His strategic command and coordination, as well as knowledge of the terrains of Eastern DRC have been pivotal in the M23's military operations. Lawrence Kanyuka, the group’s spokesperson, further underscores the organized nature of the group, serving as a crucial link in the designated communication channel. His role not only signifies effective information dissemination but also suggests a structured command hierarchy where official statements are channeled through a recognized representative. This hierarchical arrangement, from the political leadership to the military command and down to spokesperson roles, reflects a disciplined organization within the M23. Such clarity in leadership roles and communication channels contributes to the group's cohesiveness and operational efficiency.
The current M23's headquarters is believed to be strategically located at Mount Sabyinyo, which holds significant strategic importance due to its proximity to the convergence of the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda borders. This location has provided the M23 with advantageous entry and exit routes. Additionally, the M23 has maintained other camps on Mount Visoke, near the DRC-Rwanda border, and in close proximity to the Rwanda-Uganda border. This extensive network of camps strengthens the argument for the M23 as an organized armed group under International Humanitarian Law.
The M23's strategic capture of essential territories, such as key parts of Rutushuru in March 2022, and the capture of the Bunagana border town near Uganda in June 2022 and other key groupements in Rutshuru in November 2022, provides compelling evidence of the group's adept territorial control. Most notably the capture of the Rumangabo military base in Rutshuru - captured in May 2022 and subsequently withdrawn to the EAC on January 2023 showcase the M23's ability to secure critical locations. The M23's governance and administration of these captured areas are indicative of a well-organized and established structure. In the territories they control, the M23 have imposed taxes. A report by the UN group of experts on DRC (paras 39-42) in 2022 reported that the M23 have taxed households, cattle, agricultural crops as well as pedestrians that enter or leave through the Bunagana border with Uganda.
While independent verification is pending, the M23 is considered one of the groups potentially capable of downing a UN mission helicopter that crashed within their stronghold. The M23's alleged capability to shoot down a UN helicopter and operate advanced equipment like night vision devices, mortars, machine guns and precision-guided weapon systems suggests access to sophisticated weaponry. This implies a well-organized supply chain, potentially with external support, contributing to the group's military capabilities. The M23 also has a strong recruitment system in which even “several FARDC officers and soldiers have joined” the group. The UN Group report of 2023 (para 50) showed that new recruits as well as M23 fighters have subsequently been trained in the Tshanzu area in North Kivu, about 50km from Goma – the provincial capital, before being deployed.
The M23 has demonstrated a formidable capacity for strategic planning, coordination, and execution of military actions, exemplified by their successful operations in 2022. Overrunning the Rumangabo military base in May 2022 marked a significant achievement, showcasing their ability to challenge the FARDC's largest military installation in North Kivu. In June 2022, the M23's operation farther north resulted in the capture of Bunagana, compelling FARDC soldiers to retreat to Uganda. These actions reveal a well-organized armed group engaged in a strategic and conventional war, further solidifying the M23’s organization. Recently, in November 2023, advance towards Goma with the capture of Mweso, a town about 100 kilometres from the North Kivu provincial capital underscored their coordinated efforts and territorial influence.
Since 2021, the M23 has engaged in sustained armed hostilities with the FARDC, MONUSCO, other multinational forces and armed groups, through its well organized capacity to defined military strategies and tactics. Mathias Gillmann, former spokesperson of MONUSCO stated on 13 July 2022 at a UN conference that "the M23 behaves more and more like a conventional army, benefits from equipment that is much more sophisticated than in the past." The UN Special Envoy for the DRC Bintou Keita has also stated “during the most recent hostilities, the M23 has conducted itself increasingly as a conventional army rather than an armed group” adding “Should the M23 continue its well-coordinated attacks against the FARDC and MONUSCO with increasing conventional capabilities, the mission may find itself confronted by a threat that goes beyond its current capabilities.”
On several occasions, the authorities of the M23 have concluded ceasefires and peace agreements. A case in point was the withdrawal of the M23 from Kibumba, a town in North Kivu 20km away from Goma “as a goodwill gesture done in the name of peace” on 23 December 2022. Subsequently, on 6 January 2023, the M23 authorities, represented by Commander John Imani Nzenze sat down with and handed over the large Rumangabo military based in North Kivu to the regional forces of the EAC. Although the withdrawal has been termed as being merely symbolic (para 45).

In conclusion, the M23 demonstrates a clear fulfillment of the indicative factors that qualify an armed group as organized under the framework of IHL. The presence of a command structure with designated roles, the existence of a headquarters, effective territorial control, access to weapons and military equipment, strategic planning capabilities, and the ability to negotiate agreements collectively affirm the M23’s status as an organized non-state armed group. These factors collectively establish the M23 as an identifiable entity with the capacity for systematic military action, aligning with the criteria set forth in the Tadić case.

The cumulative requirements of intensity and organization are fulfilled, categorizing the conflict as a NIAC under Common Article 3. Additionally, the ratification of Additional Protocol II by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the territorial control exerted by the M23 further extend the legal framework to encompass the provisions of APII.

Involvement of Rwanda: Does the classification change? 

Allegations have surfaced claiming that Rwanda is supporting the M23 rebel group in the DRC. The President of the DRC Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo addressing the UN General Assembly’s seventy-seventh session on 20 September 2022 denounced direct military attacks and incursion into North Kivu in DRC by Rwanda and its support to the M23. The UN, as well as international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch have also accused Rwanda of backing the M23. 

© UN Photo DRC President Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo addresses the UNGA’s seventy-seventh session.

The involvement of Rwanda in supporting the M23 armed group in the DRC potentially alters the classification of the conflict, marking a transition from a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) to an international armed conflict (IAC) under International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

The jurisprudence of International Humanitarian Law stipulates that a NIAC can transform into an IAC when a foreign country exercises control over an organized armed group. However, within the jurisprudence, there have been different tests of the threshold of control necessary to establish that there was control over the armed group. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua vs. USA case and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadić case have both established tests for determining when a state can be held responsible for the actions of an armed group. The ICJ has established the “effective control” test, which requires a closer scrutiny by a State over an armed group, meaning that the armed group is completely dependent on the State. This test necessitates “an effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed”. The ICTY advanced the “overall control” test as a criterion generally valid to impute the conduct of the organized non-state armed groups to a particular state. This test requires “an overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of military operations” of the organized non-state armed group’s military activities. In such case, the State becomes a party to the conflict alongside the non-state armed group. This shift in classification is crucial as it subjects the conflict to additional rules and regulations applicable to international armed conflicts, impacting the legal framework and the rights of the parties involved. The ICRC(p.1238) as well as judicial decisions subsequent to Tadić, support the view an overall control over the conduct of organized armed groups suffices in order for the conduct of those groups or units to be legally attributed to the state.Rwanda’s involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by allegedly supporting the M23 since the group’s revival in 2021 has been a subject of international scrutiny. In the context of the armed conflict in the DRC from 2021 to 2023, this involvement of Rwanda, particularly its support for the M23 rebel group, warrants careful examination under the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the jurisprudence. 

In early August 2022, a UN Group of Experts in a confidential report stated it reported obtaining “solid evidence” that Rwandan troops have been fighting alongside the M23 in Eastern DRC, particularly in the Rutshuru territory, and providing it with weapons and support. The report stated that Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) members conducted joint attacks with M23 against FARDC and other armed groups in DRC, and that it has provided the M23 with weapons, ammunition, and uniforms. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has also reported that the M23 is backed by Rwanda, in a report where they stated that the group committed summary executions and forced recruitment of civilians in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
The UN Group report (para. 52)detailed evidence including photos of Rwandan soldiers in an M23 camp, drone footage showing columns of hundreds of soldiers marching near the Rwandan border, and photos and videos showing M23 fighters with new uniforms and equipment as well as equipped with VHF radios, night-vision equipment, vehicles, various types of assault rifles, heavy and light machine guns, various types of rocket, propelled grenade launchers, rockets, grenade launchers and grenades, recoilless guns, mortar shells and boxes of ammunition. The UN Group (para 60) also reported of a plan of the RDF “labelled 'North Kivu operations' to reinforce M23 by providing troops and materiel and to use them to secure control over mine sites, gain political influence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and decimate FDLR.” Human Rights Watch has also stated that it has significant photographic and other evidence that Rwanda is not only giving logistical support to the M23, but that Rwandan troops are reinforcing or fighting alongside the armed group inside Congo. There have also been analysis that the reason why M23 is increasingly capable of fighting like a conventional army, with equipment such as night vision devices and longer-range weapons, such as mortars and machine guns, might be because they are supplied by a well organised army, such as the RDF.
The UN report from 2022 (para 30) also mentioned that the M23 jointly with RDF troops attacked the FARDC camp in Rumangabo in May 2022. When the M23 took control of the strategic border town of Bunagana in June, Rwandan soldiers were either present or had provided equipment to the rebels. As reported by the UN Group (para 61) in 2023, the alleged “North Kivu operations” plan of the RDF “were designed and coordinated by General James Kabarebe, who is currently the Defence and Security Adviser to the President of Rwanda, and who received support for its implementation from other senior military officials of the RDF.
The UN Group (para 59) reported that it has obtained solid evidence of the presence of, and military operations conducted by RDF members in Rutshuru territory between since November 2021. The RDF also reportedly led joint attacks with M23 fighters against the DRC. The UN group stated that it “received information confirming that, on the ground, operations by RDF, including those by RDF special and reserve forces, were coordinated by Brigadier General Andrew Nyanvumba. Deployed RDF troops included members of the 201st and 301st brigades, as well as members of the RDF special forces, commanded by Captain Niragire Jean Pierre, who were deployed for specific operations from May 2022 onward. Gasasira, in turn, received instructions from Major General Ruki Karusisi, the overall commander of the RDF special forces.” Further adding, that it has obtained “evidence – including documentary and photographic evidence and aerial footage – of military operations by soldiers clearly attired in RDF military uniform in Rutshuru, Masisi and Nyiragongo territories between November 2022 and March 2023”. Human Rights Watch similarly reported that the Rwandan army has deployed troops to eastern Congo to provide direct military support to the M23, helping them expand control over Rutshuru and neighboring Masisi territories.
Some partners of Rwanda, such as the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have suspended their cooperation following accusations that Rwanda had supported the M23. In addition, the US imposed financial and property sanctions on six individuals, including a senior Rwanda military commander. Similarly, the EU added a Rwandan army captain, Capt. Jean-Pierre Niragire, to its sanctions list for his involvement and support to the M23 rebel group.

Despite the mounting evidence and international consensus pointing to Rwanda’s involvement in supporting the M23, it’s important to note that Rwanda has vehemently denied accusations by DRC’s government that it supports the M23 or that it has sent troops into the country. M23, in turn, denied accusations of being a proxy force for Rwanda and maintains its autonomy in decision-making, including the ability to sign ceasefire agreements independently. Its political leader has stated that “M23 would have captured the DRC capital, Kinshasa, within two months” if the allegations were true.

Based on the available facts, the financing and equipping of the M23 by Rwanda, as detailed in the UN Report, align with the requirements of the overall control test. The comprehensive support in the form of sophisticated weapons and equipment provided, suggests a level of involvement that extends beyond mere logistical aid. The planning and supervision of military operations, including joint attacks on FARDC camps, further implicates Rwanda in the military strategy of the M23. The reported coordination by high-ranking Rwandan military officials strengthens the case for overall control. Rwandan forces’ alleged direct involvement, as evidenced by their presence in various territories and joint attacks, aligns with both the effective and overall control tests. The evidence presented in the UN Reports and that of HRW, of RDF members conducting military operations and coordinating with M23 fighters underscores Rwanda’s direct participation in the conflict.

Notwithstanding Rwanda’s vehement denial and M23’s claim of autonomy, the mounting evidence and international consensus challenge the credibility of these assertions. The facts stated above strongly suggest that Rwanda’s involvement in supporting the M23 meets, at the very least, the overall control test. The extensive evidence of military, logistical, and strategic support positions Rwanda as a party to the conflict alongside the M23, necessitating a reevaluation of the conflict’s classification under IHL. The nuanced nature of the situation emphasizes the importance of a thorough and impartial examination to ensure respect of the relevant international humanitarian law rules.

International and Regional Interventions

The DRC conflict has attracted the involvement of numerous external actors, including neighboring countries. Rwanda and Uganda have historically supported various rebel groups, while the DRC’s government received support from Angola and Zimbabwe. The United Nations (UN) has played a significant role through its peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, which is one of the largest and most challenging UN missions globally. Additionally, regional organizations like the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been engaged in peace efforts.

MONUSCO-FARDC joint operation

Key International and regional actors playing significant roles in the DRC’s armed conflicts

The UN's engagement in the current conflict in the DRC dates back to the late 1990s.  The role of the United Nations (UN) and the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) with regards to the conflict in the DRC is multifaceted and crucial. Apart from the peacekeeping missionMONUSCO, which will be discussed below, the UN and the UNSC have been involved in various diplomatic, political, and humanitarian efforts to address the root causes and consequences of the conflict. The UN has supported the implementation of the Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region (discussed below), which was signed in 2013 by 11 countries in the presence of the UN Secretary-General. In addition, the global body has been providing humanitarian assistance and protection to the millions of people affected by the conflict, through various UN agencies, funds, and programs, such as OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO. The UN also supports the DRC government in addressing the challenges of human rights, justice, and development.

The UNSC on its part, has passed over 70 resolutions and many more statements on the DRC since August 1999 where it has, among others, condemned and called for an end to the violence and human rights violations committed by armed groups and state actors and urgeed all parties to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and to cooperate with the UN and regional organizations.In addition, it has imposed sanctions and arms embargo on individuals and entities that threaten the peace and security of the DRC, through the UNSC Sanctions Committee and the Group of Experts on the DRC. The sanctions include travel bans, asset freezes, and restrictions on the supply of arms and related material. The latest renewal of the UN sanctions regime on the DRC will last until 1 July 2024, continuing the sanctions on transport, finance and travel as well as arms embargo.

 

The most notable engagement of the UN in the DRC is through the MONUSCO (the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). In 1999, the UN established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which later evolved into the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). MONUSCO is one of the largest and most complex UN peacekeeping missions in the world. Established in 2010, MONUSCO aims to protect civilians and stabilize the region. However, it has faced attacks and criticism for perceived failures in protecting civilians.  MONUSCO's mandate includes various critical components:

 
  • Protection of Civilians: One of MONUSCO's primary objectives is to protect civilians from violence, including attacks by armed groups and human rights abuses.
  • Support for Political Processes: The mission is actively involved in supporting political initiatives and processes aimed at resolving the conflict and achieving a sustainable peace.
  • Stabilization and State-Building: MONUSCO also engages in activities related to stabilizing conflict-affected areas and assisting in state-building efforts, such as supporting electoral processes and building the capacity of national institutions.
  • Security Sector Reform: MONUSCO assists the DRC government in reforming and strengthening its security forces, including the Congolese military (FARDC), to enhance their ability to maintain security and protect civilians.
  • Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration (DDRR): MONUSCO is involved in DDRR programs aimed at encouraging armed combatants to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into civilian life.

MONUSCO has faced numerous challenges, including the vastness of the DRC, the presence of multiple armed groups, and complex political dynamics, alongside the frustration of the general public towards the deterioration of the security situation. Nevertheless, the mission has achieved notable successes, such as supporting the 2006 and 2011 elections, which marked significant steps in the country's democratic transition. The mission's involvement in military operations, in conjunction with the FARDC, has also contributed to the neutralization of various armed groups, including the defeat of the M23 in 2013.

Notwithstanding, after two decades, the DRC is now calling for the withdrawal of the MONUSCO. President of the DRC Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo in his statement at the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 20 September 2023, citing that the MONUSCO has not been successful in confronting the conflict and violence in the country, stated that “he has instructed the Government to begin discussions with UN authorities to accelerate and move up the MONUSCO withdrawal deadline from December 2024 to December 2023”.

The AU has also been engaged in efforts to address the DRC conflict, recognizing the importance of African-led solutions to African conflicts. Although it has not participated militarily, the AU has supported various initiatives and processes aimed at resolving the conflict and achieving a sustainable peace in DRC. One of such initiatives was the Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region, Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region signed in 2013 by 11 countries in the presence of UN’s former Secretary General Ban Ki Moon. Furthermore, in 2021, the AU has welcomed the DRC as a memeber of its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)which is a voluntary self-assessment tool for promoting good governance and development in the continent.   The AU's Peace and Security Council has also played an important role in discussing, mediating, and formulating strategies to address the conflict. The PSC has held numerous sessions to deliberate on the DRC situation and explore potential solutions. Since 2004, the PSC has held almost 40 meetings where the situation in the DRC was discussed at an Ambassadorial and Heads of State and Government level.
DRC joined the SADC in 1998 and since then the regional community has been involved in various interventions in the DRC, ranging from military intervention, mediation, and supporting peacebuilding processes to advocacy with the international community. SADC has deployed troops from its member states Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania to the DRC to help fight rebels in the country’s east, as part of the UN intervention brigade authorized by the Security Council in 2013 in the fight against M23. In anticipation of the DRC general elections in December 2023, SADC has reiterated its “solidarity to assist the government and people of the Republic of Congo in its efforts to restore peace and stability in the eastern part of the country”.
On July 2022, DRC became a member of the East African Community. Subsequently, through the request of the President of the DRC Félix Tshisekedi’s request, the East Africa’s DRC Force was initiated as a regional military intervention aimed to quell the violence in the eastern DRC. The force was authorized by the seven member states of the East African Community (EAC). By the time the EAC’s High Level Consultative Meeting of the Summit at heads of State level was held on November 7, 2022, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda has deployed their forces through the Joint Regional Force of the EAC in Eastern DRC, and South Sudan was urged to contribute as well. The force has been deployed gradually since then, in response to the resurgence of the M23 rebel group.  

The East Africa’s DRC force has faced several challenges and criticisms, such as the lack of a clear mandate, the coordination with the existing UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO, and the potential ulterior motives of some of the contributing countries. However, the effectiveness and impartiality of the force has been questioned particularly with the involvement of Rwanda and Uganda, and the historical as well as current disputes between the countries.

The place of International Humanitarian Law 

IHL, or international humanitarian law, is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict on people and objects. It protects those who are not or no longer participating in hostilities, such as civilians, wounded, sick, and prisoners of war, and restricts the means and methods of warfare, such as weapons and tactics. As has been qualified above, there have been protracted armed conflicts in DRC for the past two decades, involving multiple states, armed groups, and multinational troops. Therefore, IHL applies to the various conflict contexts in the country and to the parties involved in the conflict, which include the FARDC, the M23 rebel group and other organized non-state armed groups, as well as international and regional forces. 

However, the nature and scope of the applicable laws may vary depending on the classification of the conflict. According to the analysis above, the conflict in the DRC is primarily a non-international armed conflict, meaning that it takes place between the FARDC, and many non-state armed groups, or between such groups themselves. In this case, the parties are bound, at the very least, by Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which provides for minimum standards of humane treatment and prohibits various forms of violence. 

In addition, as the DRC is a signatory, the 28 provisions of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (known as Additional Protocol II) will apply to situations where organized non-state armed groups fighting against the FARDC in DRC have control over territory within the country. It should be noted in this case that Additional Protocol II does not apply to the conflict amongst the organized non-state armed groups themselves. 

All parties in the DRC are also bound by customary international humanitarian law. Customary international humanitarian law (CIHL) is a set of rules that come from “a general practice accepted as law” existing independent of treaty law. CIHL fills the gaps left by treaty law in non-international armed conflicts further strengthening the protection offered to victims of the conflict. The conflict in the DRC is primarily a non-international armed conflict. Therefore, all parties to the non-international armed conflict in DRC are bound by customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, which consists of rules that reflect the general practice and acceptance of states and other actors. These includes 136 (with some authors arguing that the number goes as high up as 147) out of the 161 CIHL rules that apply to both international and non-international armed conflicts. These rules include, for example, the fundamentalprinciples of distinction, proportionality, and precaution in attack, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, and the protection of the wounded and sick. 

IHL treaty laws such as the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I Additional to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to International armed conflicts (Additional Protocol I), as well as Customary IHL of international armed conflicts also apply to the conflict in the DRC in case it involves elements of an international armed conflict, meaning that it takes place between two or more states. This may be the case looking at the strong evidence that another state, Rwanda in particular, is supporting the M23, either by deploying its own troops or by providing material or logistical assistance beyond mere equipping, financing or training and including general military planning, coordination. In this case, with both the DRC and Rwanda being signatories of the four Geneva Conventions, as well as Additional Protocol I, the treaties apply to the conflict as it relates to the conduct of the combatants of both states. 

In addition to international humanitarian law, there is now a growing consensus that international human rights law continues to apply during times of armed conflict. While IHL is designed specifically for conflict situations, human rights law is applicable in both peace and conflict and extends protection to individuals based on their inherent dignity, with certain rights having been recognized as having extraterritorial application. As the DRC is a signatory to several human rights treaties, it is required to respect, protect and promote human rights, even in armed conflicts, and to hold accountable those who violate them including the non-state armed groups. Non-state armed groups are increasingly considered to be bound by international human rights law if they exercise de facto control over some areas.

In the context of peace forces and multinational forces operating in the DRC, such as MONUSCO and the EAC regional forces, the application of treaty IHL raises several key considerations. Particularly for the MONUSCO, historically, the UN has asserted that its peace forces are bound by the principles and spirit of IHL but not necessarily by the detailed rules. However, scholars[1] argue that peace forces become bound by IHL when engaged in hostilities against a State or a Non-State Armed Group, emphasizing the separation between jus in bello (law of war) and jus ad bellum (law in the use of force), and therefore, even if the deployment of the peace forces such as the MONUSCO is considered legitimate and deployed under the UN Charter, IHL still applies. The question of whether IHL binds peace forces depends on the factual situation and the entity exercising command and control over the operation, whether it be the UN or contributing states. The ICRC, as the guardian of IHL, holds the position that IHL applies to peace forces as well. 

However, determining when peace forces are considered engaged in armed conflict and whether it is the IHL of IACs or that of NIACs that applies remains contentious. 

The ICRC in this case has proposed a “support-based approach,” (p.584) suggesting that contributing states or the UN supporting the armed forces of a host state may be considered parties to the conflict. According to this approach and in the case of the DRC, even if the intensity criterion of Common Article 3 is not explicitly met by multinational forces, their engagement in a pre-existing NIAC could transform them into a party to that conflict. This hinges on the nature of their support, as actions integral to the pre-existing NIAC link them to the armed conflict. The support provided by multinational forces is viewed as a co-belligerent role assisting one of the parties in the ongoing conflict, making them a party to the pre-existing NIAC. Under this approach, the conditions for the applicability of IHL to multinational forces, such as the MONUSCO, involve the presence of a pre-existing NIAC in the territory where these forces intervene, their actions related to the conduct of hostilities within the context of the existing conflict, the military operations being in support of a party to the pre-existing conflict, and the actions of the forces being carried out based on an official decision by the Troop Contributing Country (TCC) or international organization involved. Fulfillment of all four conditions establishes the applicability of IHL to the actions of multinational forces in the context of a pre-existing NIAC. 

Scholars[2], on the other hand, suggests applying the usual criteria based on facts on the ground to determine the applicable IHL framework, meaning if the peace forces are engaged in conflict with the state armed forces, then IHL of IACs will apply and if they are engaged in conflict with non-state armed groups then IHL of NIACs will apply provided that the intensity and organization elements are fulfilled.

[1] Marco Sassoli, International Humanitarian Law Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019, pp. 469-470

[2] Ibid, p. 471

Humanitarian Crisis

The conflict in the DRC has resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis. Millions of Congolese have been displaced from their homes, leading to one of the largest internally displaced populations in the world. Displacement, coupled with the violence, has disrupted access to basic services, education, and healthcare. The conflict has left an indelible mark on the population, with widespread sexual violence, child recruitment, and countless lives lost due to the ongoing violence and related health issues. The AAU IHL Clinic will highlight only some of the pressing humanitarian concerns currently grappling the DRC.

  • Record number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):

The number of displaced people resulting from the conflict in the DRC has reached a record high of 6.9 million, as reported by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as of February 2023. From this number 5.8million are internally displaced within DRC, over 1million Congolese are refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries, and over 500,000 are refugees and asylum seekers from other countries living in the DRC.

Ariel view of camps for internally displaced persons around Goma, North Kivu, DRC

The violence, particularly in the eastern province of North Kivu, has forced people to flee their homes within the country, and many of them are in desperate need of assistance. With Eastern Provinces most affected, as of October 2023, about 5.6 million internally displaced people are concentrated in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, and Tanganyika. The ongoing conflict, particularly with the M23, has been cited as the primary reason for this displacement. North Kivu alone has seen over 2.3 million people displaced due to the conflict with at least 410,000 people have been displaced since the beginning of 2023. Approximately 75,000 of them have sought refuge in the Lushagala site near Goma. This site is one of many spontaneous locations and collective centers in Goma and Nyiragongo another camp hosts over 585,000 displaced people. These spontaneous sites now accommodate 25% of the more than 2.3 million IDPs in North Kivu. 

  • Conflict Related Sexual Violence

DRC has been plagued by conflict-related sexual violence, which has had devastating effects on the country’s population. This violence often includes extreme forms of abuse such as gang rape, genital mutilation, torture, and the intentional transmission of sexually transmitted diseases. The UN Secretary-General’s report on conflict-related sexual violence indicates that sexual violence in the DRC is being used as a weapon of war, torture, and retaliation amid deepening political and security crises. 

Since 2020, sexual violence has been widespread in Eastern DRC, particularly in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, and Tanganyika. In 2022, the MONUSCO documented 701 cases of conflict-related sexual violence, affecting 503 women, 187 girls, and 11 men. The majority of these cases were attributed to non-State armed groups, while state actors from the DRC and neighboring countries that support the DRC in the armed conflicts accounted for the remaining cases. The UN Secretary General’s Report on 10 October 2022 on Children and armed conflict in the DRC (para 22) stated that “Of note was that sexual violence continued to be the violation most attributed to government forces, of which elements of FARDC were the main perpetrators” 

Victims of of such widespread sexual violence in DRC suffer from long term physical and psychological injuriesand trauma, as well as HIV infections. There have been various reports of penetration with foreign objects such as guns, knives, and sticks, as well as female genital mutilation in the DRC.  There has been a growing call for the accountability of perpetrators of sexual violence in the DRC. Although in December 2022 DRC’s authorities prosecuted and convicted 22 members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 11 members of the Congolese National Police and 18 civilian men for conflict-related sexual violence, conviction rates are still shockingly low, discouraging survivors from coming forward. 

Stay tuned for ongoing updates on the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including important developments through the Unrest Early Alert System – brought to you by AAU IHL Clinic

About the author

Lea Mehari Redae
Director of the Addis Ababa University IHL Clinic and Lecturer of Law at  | lea.mehari@aau.edu.et |  + posts

Lea Mehari Redae is the Director of the Addis Ababa University IHL Clinic and a Lecturer of Law at the Addis Ababa University School of Law. She graduated from the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in October 2021 and subsequently worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross at the Headquarters in Geneva and with the Delegation to the African Union in Addis Ababa, and Amani Africa before coming back to the School of Law.

Published by Lea Mehari Redae

Lea Mehari Redae is the Director of the Addis Ababa University IHL Clinic and a Lecturer of Law at the Addis Ababa University School of Law. She graduated from the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in October 2021 and subsequently worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross at the Headquarters in Geneva and with the Delegation to the African Union in Addis Ababa, and Amani Africa before coming back to the School of Law.